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The Soviet press has published the following communique 
issued by the Soviet Information Bureau, entitled uFalsilicators 
of History (An Historical N ote)n: 
AT the end of January, the State Department of the United . States of America, in collaboration with the British and 
French Foreign Offices, published a collection of reports and 
various records from the diaries of Hitlerite diplomatic officials, 
under the mysterious title: "Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941." 
As evident from the preface to this collection, as far back as 
the summer of 1946 the Governments of the United States of 
America, Great Britain and France had already agreed to publish 
archive materials of the German Foreign Office for 1918-1945, 
seized in Germany by American and British military authorities. 
Noteworthy in this connection is the fact that the published col-
lection contains only material relating to the period of 1939-1941, 
while material relating to the preceding years, and in particular 
to the Munich _period, has not been included by the Department 
of State in the collection and thus has been concealed from world 
public opinion. This action is certainly not accidental, but pursues 
aims which have nothing to do with an objective and honest treat-
ment of historical truth. 
In order to justify in some way before world public opinion 
the unilateral publication of this collection of unverified and 
arbitrarily chosen records made by Hitlerite officials, the British 
and American press fabricated and circulated an explanation 
according to which "the Russians rejected the proposal of the West 
to publish jointly a full account of Nazi diplomacy." This state-
ment of Anglo-American circles does not correspond to the fact. 
The real facts are as follows: 
In connection with reports which appeared in the foreign 
press during the summer of 1945 to the effect that preparations 
for the publication of documents captured in Germany had been 
initiated in England, the Soviet Government approached the 
Governlnent of Great Britain, insisting on participation of 
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Soviet experts in a joint study of the German documents captured 
by Anglo-American troops. The Soviet Government held that 
publication of such documents without common consent was 
inadmissible and that at the same time it could not assume respon-
sibility for the publication of the documents without careful and 
objective verification, for unless these elementary conditions were 
observed, publication of the said material could only lead to the 
worsening of relations between the member- states of the anti-
Hitlerite coalition. 
The British Foreign Office, however, declined the Soviet pro-
posa~ on the grounds that the Soviet Government had prematurely 
raised the question of exchanging copies of the captured Hitlerite 
documents. 
It is also well known that on September 6, 1945, the 
American delegation to the Political Directorate of the Control 
Council in Germany submitted its draft directive on the handling 
of German archives and documents. This draft provided for the 
institution of a uniform procedure for the whole of Germany for 
collecting and keeping archives, and gave the right of access to 
them to representatives of member states of the United Nations. 
I t also 'provided for the possibility of copying the documents and 
publishing these copies. This proposal was examined at four 
meetings of the Political Directorate, but its further examination 
was postponed at the request of the British and Americans on the 
plea that they had no instructions; subsequently, after the Ameri-
can representative had stated that the Government of the United 
States of America was preparing a new proposal, and had requested 
that the submitted draft be invalidated, this question was with-
drawn from the agenda of the Political Directorate. 
Thus, the allegation that the Soviet Government refused to 
take part in preparing the publication of German archive materials 
is false. 
Simultaneously with the publication of the above-mentioned 
collection, a fresh campaign of unrestrained baiting and slander, 
as if at the wave of a . magic wand, swept the United States and 
countries dependent on it, in connection with the non-aggression 
pact concluded between the USSR and Germany in 1939, and 
alleg:edly directed against the Western Powers. 
Thus the true purpose for which the collection of documents 
on relations between the USSR and Germany in the period of 
1939-1941 was published in the United States of America evokes 
no doubt whatever. This was not done for the purpose of giving 
an objective exposition of historical developments, but in order to 
present a distorted picture of events, to heap lies on the Soviet 
Union, to slander it, and to undermine the international influence 
of the Soviet Union as a truly democratic and staunch fighter 
against aggressive and anti-democratic forces. 
This treacherous attitude is in conformity with the views on the 
character of inter-allied relations which are typical of the ruling 
circles of the Anglo-American countries, and the substance of 
which is that, instead of honest and sincere relations between 
allies, instead of mutual confidence and support, there is being 
pursued a policy of using every means, including even slander, 
for the purpose of weakening one's ally, of exploiting him in one's 
own narrow interests, and of strengthening one's own position at 
the expense of that ally. 
One should not, moreover, lose sight of the efforts being made 
by the ruling circles of the United States of America to under-
. mine, by means of their campaign of slander against the USSR, 
the influence of progressive elements in their own country, who 
advocate better relations with the USSR. 
The attack on progressive elements in the United States of 
America is undoubtedly aimed at undermining their influence in 
view of the Presidential elections to be held in the autumn of 1948. 
The collection is full of documents concocted by Hitlerite diplo-
matic officials in the depths of the German diplomatic offices. This 
fact alone should have served as a warning against unilateral use 
and publication of documents which are one-sided and tendentious, 
giving an account of events from the standpoint of the Hitler 
Government, and which are intended to present these events in a 
light which would be favorable to the Hitlerites. Precisely for 
this reason, the Soviet Government was opposed to unilateral -
publication of the captured German documents without prelimi-
nary thorough and joint verification of them. 
Even the French Government . news agency, France Presse, 
found itself compelled to admit that the procedure of publication 
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of the materials to be published by the three Governments with-
out the knowledge of the Soviet Union, "is not quite in accord 
with normal diplomatic procedure". Nonetheless, the British Gov-
ernment did not agree with this. 
The American, British, and French Governments have uni-
laterally published the German documents without hesitating to 
falsify history in their efforts to slander the Soviet Union, which 
bore the brunt of the struggle against Hitlerite aggression. 
By doing so, these Governments have assumed full responsibility 
for the consequences of this unilateral action. 
In view of this, the Soviet Government on its part feels itself 
entitled to make public the secret documents concerning relations 
between Hitler Germany and the Governments of Great Britain, 
the United States of America and France which fell into the 
hands of the Soviet Government, and which the above-mentioned 
three Governments concealed from public opinion. 
They concealed these documents; they do not want to make 
them public. But we believe that after all which has taken place 
these documents must be made public, so that historical truths can 
be re-established. 
The Soviet Government possesses important documents which 
were captured by Soviet troops during the smashup of Hitler 
Germany; publication of these documents will help to present 
a true picture of how Hitler's aggression and the Second World 
War were in reality prepared and develope.d. 
The same purpose is also served by the historical note, "Falsi-
ficators of History", now being published by the Soviet Informa-
tion Bureau under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. 
Secret documents pertaining to this subject will be published-
shortly. 
1. How Preparations for German Aggression Were Commenced. 
AMERICAN fakers and their British and French associates are trying to create the impression that the preparations for Ger-
man aggression which developed into the Second W orId War were 
begun in the autumn of 1939. Yet who can swallow this bait 
nowadays but absolutely naive people prepared to believe any 
sensational fabrication? 
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Who does not know that Germany began preparing for war 
imm·ediately . after Hitler had come to power? Who does not 
know, moreover, that the Hitler regime was established by Ger-
man monopoly <;ircles with the full approval of the ruling camp 
of England, France and the United States? 
In order to prepare for war and to provide herself with the 
most mod~rn armament, Germany had to restore and develop her 
heavy industry, and first of .all her metallurgical and war in-
dustries in the Ruhr. Having sustained defeat in the first imperial-
ist war Germany, then under the yoke of the Versailles treaty, 
.could not do this with her own forces in a short period. German 
imperialism was rendered powerful support in this matter by the 
United States of America. 
Who does not know that in the post-Versailles period, American 
banks and trusts, acting in full accord with the Government, made 
investments in German economy -and granted Germany credits 
running into billions ~f dollars, which were spent on reconstruc-
tion and development of the war industrial potential of Germany? 
I t is known that the post-Versailles period was marked for Ger-
many by a whole system of measures directed toward the recon-
struction of German heavy industry and in particular of the 
German war industrial potential. 
Of tremendous importance in this respect was the so-called 
Dawes Reparation Plan for Germany by means of which the 
United States of America and England planned to render Ger-
man industry dependent upon American and British monopolies. 
The Dawes Plan cleared the road for a heavy influx and infiltra-
tion of foreign, chiefly American, capital into German industry. 
As a result of this, the rise of German economy caused by an 
intensive process o·f re-equipm'ent of production machinery had 
already begun in 1925. At the same time, German exports rose 
sharply and by 1927 reached the level of 1913, while in the case 
of manufactured goods they even surpassed that level by 12 per 
cent (in 1913 prices). During the six years from 1924 through 
1929, the influx of foreign capital into Germany totalled between 
10 and 15 billion-odd reichsmarks for long term investments and 
more than six billion reichsmarks for short term investments. 
According to some sources, the volume of capital investments was 
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consid'erably higher. This led to a colossal growth of the economic, 
and in particular, of the war, potential of Germany. A leading 
part in this matter was played by American capital investments 
which amounted to no less than 70 per cent of the total long term 
loans. 
Well known is the role played by American monopolies 
headed by the DuPont, Morgan, Rockefeller, and Lamont fami-
lies and other industrial barons of the United States in financing 
German heavy industry and in establishing and expanding exceed-
ingly close connections between American and German industries. 
The leading American monopolies proved to be most closely , 
connected with German heavy industry, war industry concerns 
and banks. 
The leading American chemical concern, E. I. duPont de 
Nemours & Co., Inc. and the British Imperial chemical trust 
(Imperial Chemical Industries) which was one of the largest 
shareholders of the General l\1otors automobile trust, maintained 
close industrial relations with the German chemical concern, I. G. 
Farbenindustrie, with which in 1926 they concluded a cartel 
agreement for a division of the' world powder market. Before the 
war, the president of the Board of Directors of Rohm and Haas 
Company in Philadelphia was a partner of the head of the same 
company in Darmstadt (Germany). Incidentally, at present, the 
former director of this concern, Rudolf Mueller, is active in 
"Bizonia" and plays an important part among the leaders of the 
Christian Democratic Union. Schmitz, the German capitalist 
president of I. G. Farbenindustrie and a member of the board of 
Deutsche Bank, controlled the General Dyestuffs Corporation, an 
American firm, during the period from 1931 to 1939. After the 
Munich Conference (1938), the American Standard Oil trust 
signed a contract with I. G. Farbenindustrie under which the 
latter was given a share in the profits from the ' production of 
aviation gasoline in the United States and in return willingly 
ceased exporting from Germany synthetic gasoline which it was 
prod ucing and which Germany was storing up for war needs. 
Such connections are not typical of American capitalist monopolies 
alone. Thus, extremely close economic relations not only of com-
mercial but also of military importance existed, on the very eve 
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of war, between the Federation of British Industries and the 
German Reichs Industrie group. In 1939, representatives of these 
two monopolies issued a joint statement in Dusseldorf which said 
in part that the purpose of the agreement was "to secure the fullest 
possible cooperation between the industrial systems of their respec-
tive countries." And this took place at a time when Hitler Ger-
many had swallowed Czechoslovakia! No wonder that the Lon-
don magazine Economist wrote in this connection: "Is there not 
something in the Dusseldorf air that makes reasonable men lose 
their senses ?"l 
The well known Schroder Bank in which a leading part was 
played by the German steel trust V ereinigte Stahlwerke, which 
was organized by Stinnes, Thyssen and other captains of Ruhr 
industry and ha'd its headquarters in N ew York and London, 
furnishes a typical example of the close interweaving of American 
and German as well as British capital. Allen Dulles, director of 
Schrqder Banking Corporation in N ew York, ~hich repre-
sented the Schroder interests in London, Cologne and Hamburg, 
played a leading role in the affairs of this bank. The well-known 
Sullivan & Cromwell law firm headed by John Foster Dulles, 
now Mr. Marshall's chief adviser and closely connected with 
Rockefeller's world oil trust, Standard Oil, as well as with the 
Chase National Bank, the most powerful' bank in America which 
made enormous investments in German industry, played the leading 
role in the N ew York headquarters of the Schroder Bank. In his 
book which appeared in New York in 1947, Richard Sasuly stresses 
the fact that no sooner had inflation been checked in Germany in 
the post-Versailles period and the reichsmark had gained strength 
than a torrent of foreign loans ru'shed into Germany. Between 
1924 and 1930 Germany's foreign debt increased by more than 
thirty billion reichsmarks. With the help of fore'ign, chiefly 
American, capital, German industry, especially the Vereinigte 
Stahlwerke '(a German firm), was extensively reconstructed and 
modernized. Some loans were granted -directly to companies which 
played a leading ' part in rearmament.2 
1 Corwin D. Edwards, Economic and Political Aspects of International 
Cartels, 1944. 
2 Richard Sasuly, 1. G. Farben, Boni and Gaer, New York, 1947, p. 80. 
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Dillon, Read & Co., one of the largest N ew York banks, of 
which James Forrestal, the present Secretary of Defense, had been 
a director for a number of years, played a leading part in financing 
the German steel trust Vereinigte Stahlwerke in that period along 
with the Anglo-German-American Schroder Bank.3 
I t was this golden rain of American dollars that fertilized the 
heavy industry of Hitler Germany and in particular her war 
industry. It was billions of American dollars invested by overseas 
monopolies in the war economy of Hitler Germany that re-estab-
lished Germany's war potential and placed in the hands of the 
Hitler regime the weapons it needed for aggression. Relying on 
the financial support which came chiefly from American monopo-
lies, Germany within a short period of time re-established a pow-
erful war industry that was capable of producing enormous 
amounts of first-rate atmament, thousands upon thousands of 
tanks, planes, and guns as well as naval ships of the latest designs 
and armament of other kinds. Fakers of history would like to forget 
all ' this, as they are trying to evade responsibility for their policy 
which supplied Hitler aggression with arms, unleashed the Second 
World War and led to war ' disaster without parallel in history, 
which cost mankind millions upon millions of victims. 
Thus it must not be forgotten that the first and foremost pre-
requisite of Hitler aggression was provided by the resurgence and 
modernization of Germany's heavy industry and war industry, and 
that this became possible only as a result of the direct and exten-
sive financial support rendered by the ruling circles of the United 
States of America. And yet this is not all. 
Another factor of decisive importance which helped to unleash 
Hi tler aggression was the policy of the ruling circles of England 
and France which is known as the policy of "appeasing" Hitler 
Germany, a policy of renouncing collective security. At present 
it should be clear to everyone that it was this policy of British and 
French ruling circles as expressed in their renunciation of collec-
tive security, in their refusal to resist German aggression, in their 
3 Stock Exchange Year Book, London, 1925; Who's Who in America; 
, Who's Who in American Finance; Moody's Manual of Corporations," Poor's 
Manual of Corporations, 1924-1939. 
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connivance with Hitler Germany's aggressIve demands, that led 
to the Second World War. 
We shall now turn to further facts. In 1933, soon after Hitler 
came to power, a "Pact of Accord and Cooperation" was signed in 
Rome by the four Powers-Great Britain, Germany, France and 
Italy-through the efforts of the British and French Governments. 
This pact signified that the British and French Governments 
came to terms with German and Italian fascism, which even at 
that time did not try to conceal its aggressive intentions. At the 
same time, this pact with the fascist states signified the renuncia-
tion of the policy of strengthening the united front of the peace-
loving powers against the aggressive states. By coming to terms 
with Germany and Italy behind the backs of the other powers 
who were taking part in the disarmament conference which was 
being held at that time and was discussing a Soviet proposal on the 
conclusion of a non-aggression pact and of a pact on the definition 
of an aggressor, Great Britain and' France dealt a blow to the 
cause of peace and the security of nations. Soon after, in 1934, 
Eng~and and France helped Hitler to take advantage of the 
inimical attitude of their ally Poland-ruled by her gentry-
toward the USSR, and this resulted in the cond usion of the 
non-aggression pact between Germany and Poland which formed 
one of the important stages in the preparation of German ag-
gressIon. 
Hitler needed this pact for the purpose of disorganizing the 
ranks of the adherents of collective security and to show by this 
example that what Europe needed was not collective security 
but bilateral agreements. This enabled the German aggressor to 
decide for himself with whom to conclude agreements and when 
to conclude them, whom to attack and when to do so. Beyond any 
doubt, the German-Polish pact constituted the first serious break 
in the edifice of collective security. Hitler grew bold and openly 
took a series of steps to re-establish Germany's armed forces with-
out encountering any opposition on the part of the rulers of Eng-
land and France. On the contrary, soon after that, in 1935, a naval 
agreement between Britain and Germany was concluded in London 
where Ribbentrop had arrived for this purpose. Under this agree-
ment, Great Britain consented to re-establishment of German 
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naval forces in a strength which nearly equalled that of the French 
Navy. Besides, Hitler obtained the right to build submarines with 
an aggregate displacement amounting to 45 per cent of that of 
the British submarine fleet. During the same period, Hitler Ger-
many also took unilateral actions aimed at abolishing all other 
restrictions on the growth of Germany's armed forces that" had 
been imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. These actions encountered 
no opposition on the part of England, France or the United 
States. The appetite of the fascist aggressors grew every day with 
the manifest connivance of the United States, Great Britain and 
France. 
It was certainly not accidental that at that time both Germany 
and Italy easily got away with their arm-ed interventions In 
Ethiopia and Spain. 
The Soviet Union alone consistently and firmly pursued its 
policy of peace, championing the principles of the equality and 
independence of Ethiopia, who was moreover a member of the 
League of Nations, and the right of the lawful Republican Gov-
ernment in Spain to receive the support of the democratic coun-
tries against German and Italian intervention. 
"The Soviet Union," said V. M. Molotov at the session of the 
Central Executive Committee of the USSR on January 10, 1936 
in connection with Italy's attack on Ethiopia, "has demonstrated 
in the League of Nations its fidelity to this principle-the principle 
of the political independence and national equality of all states, 
in the case of one of the small countries, Abyssinia. The Soviet 
Union has also taken advantage of its membership in the League 
of Nations to put into practice its policy toward an imperialist 
aggressor."4 Molotov said also at that time that "The Italo-
Abyssinian war shows that the threat of a world war is growing 
and is steadily spreading over Europe."5 
And what were the Governments of the United States, Great 
Britain and France' doing at that time, under whose eyes the 
fascist bandits were dealing ever more insolently with their vic-
tims? They did not as ,much as lift a finger to curb the German 
4. v. M. Molotov, Articles and Speeches, 1935-,1936, p. 176. 
5 V. M. Molotov, Articles and Speeches, 1935-1936, p. 177 . 
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and Italian aggressors, to defend the rights of nations which were 
being trampled upon, to preserve peace and to stop the Second 
World War which was approaching. The Soviet Union alone was 
doing everything possible in order to block the fascist aggressors' 
way. The Soviet Union came forward as the initiator and cham-
pion of collective security. As early as February 6, 1933, M. M. 
Litvinov, the Representative of the Soviet Union in the General 
Commission on Disarmament, proposed that the Commission adopt 
a declaration on the definition of aggression and aggressor. 
In proposing a definition of aggressor, the Soviet Union held 
that it was necessary in the interests of general security and in 
order to facilitate agreement on the maximum reduction of arma-
ments to define the term "aggression" with the utmost possible 
precision in order to "forestall every pretext for its justification." 
This proposal was, however, declined by the Conference; which 
was acting under the direction of England and France for the • 
benefit of German aggression. Everybody knows what a persistent 
and prolonged struggle was waged by the Soviet Union and by 
its delegation to the League of Nations, headed by Litvinov, to 
maintain and consolidate collective security. Throughout the 
whole prewar period, the Soviet delegation upheld the principle of 
collective security in the League of Nations, raising its voice in 
defense of this principle at practically every session of the League 
of Nations, in practically every commission of the League of 
Nations. It is known, however, that the voice of the Soviet delega-
tion remained a voice in the wilderness. 
The whole world is familiar with the proposals made by the 
Soviet delegation concerning measures for strengthening collec-
tive security, proposals which, on the instruction of the Soviet 
Government, were addressed to Mr. Avenol, Secretary-General 
of the League of Nations, on August 30, 1936, with a request 
that they should be discussed by the League of Nations. 
It is also known, however, that these proposals were buried in 
th~ archives of the League of Nations and that no action was 
taken on them. It was clear that England and France, who con-
trolled the League of Nations at the time, rejected collective 
resistance to German aggression. They rejected collective security 
because it stood in the , ·way of their newly adopted policy of 
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"appeasing" German aggression, a policy of concessions to Hitler 
aggression. Naturally, this policy could not but result in the 
intensification of German aggression, but the ruling Anglo-French 
circles believed that this was not dangerous because, having satis-
fied Hitler aggression by concessions in the West, they could then 
direct this aggression to the East and utilize it as a weapon against 
the USSR. 
In his report to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union in March, 1939, J. V. Stalin, analyzing 
the reasons for the growth of Hitlerite aggression, said: 
"The chief reason is that the majority of the non-aggressive 
countries, particularly England and France, have rejected the 
policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance 
to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of non-inter-
vention, a position of neutrality."6 
In order to confuse the reader and at the same time to slander 
the Soviet Government, Neal Stanford, an American journalist, 
asserts that th~ Soviet Government was opposed to collective 
security, that Litvinov was dismissed and replaced by Molotov in 
the post of the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs because he 
had been pursuing a policy of consolidating collective security. 
One could hardly imagine anything more stupid than this fantastic 
assertion. It is clear that Litvinov did not pursue any policy of 
his own, but the policy of the Soviet Government. On the other 
hand, everybody knows what a struggle for collective security was 
waged by the Soviet Government and by its representatives, 
including Litvinov, throughout the prewar period. 
As regards the appointment of Molotov to the post of People's 
Commissar of Foreign Affairs, it is perfectly clear that in the com-
plex situation, when fascist aggressors were preparing the Second 
World War, when Great Britain and France, backed by the 
United States of America were plainly abetting the aggressors 
and spurring them on to start a war against the USSR, it was 
necessary to have in such a responsible post as that of People's 
Commissar of Foreign Affairs a political leader with greater 
experience and greater popularity in the country than Litvinov. 
• J. V. Stalin, Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the 
Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU (B). 
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The rejection of the collective security pact by the Western 
Powers was not fortuitous. 
I t was in that period that the struggle between two lines in 
world affairs had developed. One' was that of the struggle for 
peace, for the organization of collective security and for resistance 
to aggression by the joint efforts of the peace-loving nations. 
This was the line the Soviet Union was pursuing, consistently 
and staunchly defending the interests of all peace-loving nations, 
great and small. The other line was that of rejecting the organiza-
tion of collective security, of refusing to oppose aggression, and 
this inevitably encouraged' the fascist countries to intensify their 
aggressive activity and thereby helped to unleash a new war. 
Historical truth, as can be seen from all this, consists of the 
facts that Hitlerite aggression became possible, firstly because the 
United States of America helped the Germans to establish within 
a short time a war economic base for German aggression and thus 
provided this aggression with arms; and secondly, because the 
rejection of collective security by the ruling Anglo-French circles 
disorganized the ranks of the peace-loving ' countries, disrupted ' 
the united front of these countries against aggression, paved the 
road for German aggression and helped Hitler to unleash the 
_Second World War. 
What would have happened if the United States had not 
financed Hitler Germany's heavy industry, and England and 
France had not rejected collective security, but on the contrary 
had organized jointly with the Soviet :Union collective resistance 
to German aggression? The result would have been that Hitlerite 
aggression would lack armament, Hitler's annexationist policy 
would have been caught in the vise of a system of collective 
security, the Hitlerites' chance of success in unleashing the Second 
World War would have been reduced to the minimum. 
And if in spite of unfavorable conditions, the Hitlerites had 
still ventured to unleash the Second World War, they would have 
been defeated in the very first year of war. Unfortunately, this 
did not happen because of the ruinous policy which was pursued 
by the United States of America, England and Franc.e during 
the course of the whole· prewar period. 
It is they who' are guilty of allowing the Hitlerites to unleash 
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with some measure of success the Second World War, which 
lasted nearly six years and took millions of human lives. 
2. Not a Struggle Against German Aggression but a Policy of 
Isolating the USSR. 
S UBSEQUENT develog ents have shown with still greater clarity that by their concessions to and connivance with fas-
cist countries, which in 1936 formed a military-political bloc 
known as the "Berlin-Rome Axis", the ruling circles in Britain 
and France had only encouraged and goaded Germany toward 
aggresSIon. 
Rejecting the policy of collective security, Britain and France 
took up a position of so-called non-intervention, characterized by 
]. V. Stalin thus: 
" ... the policy of non-intervention might be defined as fol-
lows: 'Let each country defend itself from aggressors as it 
likes and as best it can. That is not our affair. We shall trade 
both with aggressors and with their victims.' But, actually 
speaking, the policy of non-intervention means conniving at 
aggression, giving free rein to war, and consequently trans-
forming the war- into a world war."7 
Stalin further pointed out that: 
". . . the big and dangerous political game started by the 
supporters of the policy of non-intervention may end in a seri-
ous fiasco for them."8 
As far back as 1937, it became perfectly clear that a great war 
was being hatched by Hitler with the direct connivance of Great 
Britain and France. Documents of the German Foreign Ministry 
captured by Soviet troops after Germany's defeat reveal the true 
essence of Great Britain's and France's policy of the time. These 
documents show that, essentially, Anglo-French policy was aimed 
not at mustering the forces of the peace-loving states for a com-
mon struggle against aggression, but at isolating the USSR and 
directing the Hitlerite aggression toward the East, against the 
Soviet Union, at using Hitler as a tool for their own ends. 
7 Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU (B) , Stenographic Report, Ogiz, 
1939, p. 13. 
8 Ibid, p. 14. 
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The rulers of Britain and France were well aware of the trend 
of Hitlerite foreign policy, defined by Hitler as follows: 
"We, the National Socialists, consciously put an end to our 
prewar foreign policy. We begin where we ended six centuries 
ago. We stop the Germans' eternal drive to Europe's South 
and West, and turn our eyes to the lands in the East. We 
break at last with the colonial and commercial policies of pre-
war times and go over to a territorial policy of the future. 
But when we now, in Europe, speak of new lands, we should 
have in mind first of all only Russia and the bordering coun-
tries under her rule. Destiny itself seems to show us the way."9 
It was customary until lately to consider that ~ntire responsibil-
ity for the Munich policy of treachery rests with the ruling circles 
of Britain and France, with the Governments of Chamberlain 
and Daladier. 
The fact that the American Government undertook tb make the 
German files public, while excluding the documents pertaining to 
the Munich agreement, shows that the United States Government 
is interested in whitewashing the heroes of the Munich treachery 
and in putting the blame on the USSR. The substance of Britain's 
and France's Munich policy was sufficiently clear even before 
this. Documents from the archives of the German Foreign Min-
istry, now at the disposal of the Soviet Government, furnish, 
however, abundant new data which reveal the true meaning of 
the prewar diplomacy of . the Western Powers; they show how 
the destinies of nations were played with, how brazenly these 
Powers traded in other peoples' territories, how they had been 
secretly re-dividing the map of the world, how they encouraged 
Hitlerite aggression, and they show the efforts made to direct 
that aggression toward the East, against the Soviet Union. 
This is eloquently borne out, for in~tance, by a German docu-
ment recording a conversation which took place between Hitler 
and the British Minister, Halifax, in the presence of Von N eu-
rath, the German Foreign Minister, in Ob~rsalzburg on No-
vember 19, 1937. Halifax declared that 
"he (Lord Halifax) and the other members of the British 
9 A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, Munich, 1936, p. 742. 
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Government were fully aware that the Fuehrer had attained 
a great deal, not only inside Germany herself, but that having 
destroyed Communism in his country, he had barred the road 
of the latter to Western Europe, and that therefore Germany 
was entitled to b~ regarded as the bulwark of the West against 
Bolshevism."lo 
Speaking on behalf of the British Pr.ime Minister, Chamber-
lain, Halifax pointed out that there was every possibility of find-
ing a solution even of difficult problems if Germany and Britain 
could reach . agreement with France and Italy too. 
Halifax said that 
"there should not be an impression that the Berlin-Rome Axis, 
or tlilat good relations between London and Paris, would suf-
fer as a result of Anglo-German rapprochement. After the 
ground is prepared by Anglo-German rapprochement, the four 
great West-European Powers [i.e., Great Britain, France, 
Germany and Italy] must jointly set up the fdundatio~ for 
lasting peace in Europe. Under no conditions should any of the 
four Powers remain outside this co-operation, or else there 
would be · no end to the present unstable situation."ll 
In other words, Halifax, as far back as 1937, had proposed to 
Hitler on behalf of the British. Government, that Britain as well 
as France should join the Berlin-Rome Axis. 
To this proposal, however, Hitler replied with a statement to 
the effect that such an agreement among the four Powers seemed 
to him very easy to arrange if good will and a kindly attitude pre-
vailed, but that it would prove more difficult if Germany were 
not regarded "as a state which no longer carr.ied the moral and 
material stigma of the Treaty of Versailles." 
In reply to this, Halifax, according to the record, said: 
"'Britishers are realists and perhaps more than others are 
convinced that the errors of the Versailles dictate must be 
rectified. Britain has always exercised her influence in this real-
10 The Record of a conversation between the Fuehrer and Reichskanzler 
and Lord Halifax, in the presence of the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs, 
in Obel'salzberg, Nov. 19, 1937,· from the Archives of the German Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. 
U Cit. The Record of a co"!'versation. 
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IstlC sense in the past.' He pointed to Britain's role with re-
gard to the evacuation of the Rhineland ahead of the time 
fixed, the settlement of the reparations problem, and the re-
occupation of the Rhineland."12 
From the further record of Hitler's conversation with Halifax, 
it is evident that the British Government viewed favorably Hitler's 
plans for the "acquisition" of Danzig, Austria, and Czechoslo-
vakia. Having discussed with Hitler the questions of disarma-
ment and the League of Nations, and having noted that further 
discussion was needed, Halifax ~tated: 
"All other questions can be characterized as relating to 
changes in the European order, changes which sooner or later 
will probably take place. To these questions belong those of 
Danzig, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. England is only inter-
ested that these changes should be effected by peaceful evolu-
tion, so as to avoid methods which may cause further convul-
sions, undesired either by the Fuehrer or by other countries."13 
This conversation evidently was not the mere sounding out of 
an interlocutor, which sometimes is called for by political neces-
sity; it was a deal, a secret agreement of the British Government 
with Hitler about satisfying the annexationist appetites of the 
latter at the expense of third countries. In this connection, the 
statement in Parliament of the British Minister Simon on Feb-
ruary 21, 1938, is noteworthy. He said that Great Britain had 
never given special guarantees regarding the independence of 
Austria. This was a deliberate lie, because such guarantees were 
given by the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. 
At the same time, British Prime Minister Chamberlain stated 
that Austria could not count upon any protection on the part of 
the League of Nations: 
"We must not try to delude ourselves, and still more, we 
must not try to delude small weak nations into thinking that 
they will be protected by the League against aggression and 
acting accordingly, when we know that nothing of the kind 
can be expected."14 
12 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
U Times, February 23, 1938, p. 8. 
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In this way the makers of British policy encouraged Hitler to 
annexa tionist actions. 
In the German archives captured by the Soviet troops in Berlin, 
there is also a record of Hitler's conversation with Henderson, 
British Ambassador to Germany, which took place in the presence 
of Ribbentrop on March 3, 1938.15 From its very outset Hender-
son stressed the confidential nature of the conversation, intimating 
that its content would be withheld from the French, Belgians, 
Portuguese and Italians, who would merely be told that a con-
versation took place as a continuation of negotiations which had 
been carried on between Halifax and Hitler and related to 
questions of concern to Germany and Britain. 
Speaking on behalf of the British Government, Henderson in 
this conversation stressed that: 
"This is not a commercial deal but · an attempt to establish 
the basis for a genuine and cordial friendship with Germany, 
beginning with the improvement of the situation and ending 
with the creation of a new spirit of friendly understanding. "16 
Without objecting to Hitler's demand to "unite Europe with-
out Russia," Henderso'n drew attention to the fact that Halifax, 
who at that time became Foreign Secretary, had already agreed 
to those territorial changes which Germany intended to make in 
Europe, and that 
"the purpose of the British proposal was participation in such 
a reasonable settlement." 
Henderson, according to the record, also said that Chamberlain 
"displayed great courage when heeding nothing, he unmasked 
such international phrases as collective security, etc .... " 
"Therefore," added Henderson, "Britain declares her readi-
ness to remove all difficulties and asks Germany wheth~r she is 
ready, for her part, to do the same."17 
When Ribbentrop intervened, drawing the attention of Hen-
derson to the fact that the British Minister to Vienna "in a 
115 Record of a conversation between the Fuehrer and Reichskansler and 
the British Royal Ambassador which took place in the presence 0/ Reichs-
minister /01' Foreign Affairs von Ribbentrop, on March 3, 1938 in Berlin, 




dramatic way" had made a statement to von Papen on events in 
Austria, Henderson hastened to dissociate himself from the state-
ment of his colleague, declaring that "he himself, Neville Hen-
derson, often expressed himself in favor of Anschluss." Such was 
the language of prewar British diplomacy. 
Immediately after that deal, on March 12, 1938, Hitler seized 
Austria, having met with no resistance on the part · of Britain and 
France. At that time, only the Soviet Union raised the voice of 
warning, and once again came forward with an appeal to organ-
ize collective protection of the independence of countries which 
were threatened by aggression. . 
It was on March 17, 1938, that the Soviet Government sent 
a note to the Powers in which it expressed its readiness "to proceed 
to discussion, with other Powers in or outside the League of Na-
tions, of practical measures" which "would aim at stopping fur-
ther aggression and eliminating the increased danger of a new 
world butchery."is 
The reply of the British Government to the Soviet note proved 
the unwillingness of the British Government to hinder these plans 
of Hitlerite aggression. 
The reply stated that a conference for taking 
"concerted action against aggression would not necessarily, in 
the view of His Majesty's Government, have a favorable effect 
upon the prospects of European peace. "19 
The next link in the chain of German aggression and the prep-
aration of war in Europe was the seizure of Czechoslovakia by 
Germany. And this most important step in unleashing war in 
Europe could be talHn by Hitler only with the direct support 
of England and France. 
On July 10, 1938, Dirksen, the German Ambassador to Lon-
don, reported to Berlin that for the British Government 
"one of the most essential planks of its program is to find a 
compromise with Germany", and that "this Government dis-
plays with regard to Germany such a maximum of understand-
18 Izvestia, March 18, 1938. 
19 Note of the British Foreign Office of March 24, 1938. 
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ing as could be displayed by any of the likely combinations of 
British politicians."2o 
Dirksen wrote that the British Government "has come nearer 
to understanding the most essential points of the main demands 
advanced by Germany; namely: to keep the Soviet Union out 
of deciding the destinies of Europe; likewise to keep out the 
League of Nations; as well as the advisability of bilateral 
negotiations and treaties." 
Dirksen also reported to Berlin that the British Government was 
ready to make great sacrifices to "meet the other just demands 
of Germany." . 
Thus, between the British Government and Hitler there was 
indeed established a far-reaching accord on foreign policy plans, 
which fact Dirksen so lucidly reported to Berlin. It is not nec-
essary to recall the universally known facts relating directly to the 
Munich deal. But one cannot forget that on September 19, 1938, 
i. e., four days after Hitler's meeting at Berchtesgaden with Cham-
berlain, who arrived for this purpose by plane, representatives of 
the British and French Governments demanded from the Czecho-
slovak Government the transfer to Germany of the Czechoslovak · 
regions populated mainly by Sudeten Germans. 
They maintained that if this demand were not complied with, 
it would be impossible to preserve peace and to secure the vital 
in terests of Czechoslovakia. 
The Anglo-French sponsors of Hitler's aggression attempted 
to cover their treachery with the promise of an international guar-
antee of the new frontiers of the Czechoslovak State as "a con-
tribution to the pacification of Europe."21 
On September 20, the Czechoslovak Government replied to 
the Anglo-French proposals. It declared that "acceptance of such 
proposals would be tantamount to the voluntary and full dis-
ruption of the State in all its directions." The Czechoslovak Gov-
ernment drew the attention of the British and French Govern-
ments to the fact that "the paralysis of Czechoslovakia would 
10 Political Report, London, July 10, 1938, in addition to Report A No. 
2589 of July 10, a. c.; from the Archives of the German Foreign Office. 
:n. Correspondence respecting Czechoslovakia, September 1938, London, 
1938, C md 5847. p. -. 
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result in deep political changes in all Central and Southeastern 
E " urope. 
"The balance of power in Central Europe and in Europe in 
general," stated the Czechoslovak Government in its answer, 
"would be destroyed; that would entail far-reaching conse-
quences for all other states and especially for France." 
The Czechoslovak Government addressed its "last appeal" to 
the Governments of Britain and France to reconsider their point 
of view, emphasizing that this was in the interests not only of 
Czechoslovakia, but of her friends as well, in the interests of "the 
entire cause of peace and the cause of the healthy development 
of Europe." 
The Anglo-French rulers remained implacable. Qn the next 
day, the British Government sent to the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment a note in reply, suggesting that the latter should withdraw 
its answer to the original Anglo-French proposals and "speedily 
and seriously weigh the matter" before creating a situation for 
which the British Government could take no responsibility. The 
British Government further emphasized that it could not believe 
that the Czechoslovak proposal of arbitration would now be ac-
ceptable. In the opinion of the British Government, the British 
note stated, "the German Government does not consider the situ-
ation to be such as could be solved by arbitration as suggested by 
the Czechoslovak Government." In conclusion, the British note 
threateningly warned the Czechoslovak Government "that if 
British advice is rejected, the Czechoslovak Government will be 
free to take any steps it may deem befitting the situation which 
may develop later." 
At a conference of Hitler, Chamberlain, Mussolini, and Dala-
dier held in Munich on September 29 and 30, 1938, the disgrace-
ful deal, which had been completely agreed upon in advance among 
the chief participants ' in the conspiracy against the peace, was 
finally concluded. The fate of Czechoslovakia was decided behind 
her back. Representatives of Czechoslovakia were invited to Mun-
ich only meekly to await the results of the conspiracy of the im-
perialists. The entire conduct of Britain and France left no doubt 
that this unheard-of act of treachery on the part of the British and 
French Governments in regard to the Czechoslovak people and 
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republic, far from being a chance episode in the policy of these 
States, represented a highly important phase in their policy aimed 
at goading the Hitlerite aggressors against the Soviet Union. 
The true meaning of the Munich conspiracy was then exposed 
by J. V. Stalin who said that "the districts of Czechoslovakia were 
yielded to Genpany as the price of undertaking to launch war 
on the Soviet U nion."22 
The essence of that policy of the Anglo-French ruling circles 
of the time was exposed by J. V. Stalin at the Eighteenth Congress 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), in 
March, 1939. . 
"The policy of non-intervention means conniving at aggres-
sion, giving free rein to war, and consequently transforming 
the war into world war. The policy of non-intervention reveals 
an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their 
nefarious work: not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling 
herself in a war with China, or better still, with the Soviet 
Union; not to hinder Germany, say, from enmeshing herself 
in European affairs, from embroiling herself in a war with 
the Soviet Union; to allow all belligerents to sink deeply into 
the mire of war; to encourage them surreptitiously in this 
direction; to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another; 
and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on 
the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of course, in 'the 
interests of peace', and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled 
belligerents. "23 
The Munich agreement was met with indignation and em-
phatic condemnation in the democratic circles of various coun-
tries, including the United States of America, Great Britain, and 
France. The attitude of these circles toward the Munich treachery 
of the Anglo-French rulers may be judged by the statements made, 
for instance, by Sayers and Kahn, who in their book The Great 
22 Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU (B) , Stenographic Report, Ogiz, 
1939, p. 14. 
23 Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU (B) , Stenographic Report, Ogiz, 
1939, p. 13. 
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Conspiracy: the Secret War Against Soviet Russia~ published in the 
United States of America, had the following to say about Munich: 
"The Governments of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Great 
Brit.ain and France signed the Munich Pact-the anti-Soviet 
Holy Alliance of which world reaction had been dreaming 
since 1918. The Pact left Soviet Russia without allies. The 
Franco-Soviet Treaty, cornerstone of European collective secur-
ity, was dead. The Czech Sudetenland became part of Nazi 
Germany. The gates of the East were open wide open for the 
Wehrmacht."24 
Through all phases of the Czechoslovak drama, the Soviet 
Union alone of all the Gr.eat Powers vigorously championed the 
independence and national rights of Czechoslovakia. Seeking to 
justify themselves in the eyes of public opinion, the Governments 
of Great Britain and France hypocritically declared that they did 
not know whether or not the Soviet Union would live up to its 
pledges, given to Czechoslovakia in accordance with the treaty 
of mutual assistance. But this was a deliberate lie, for the Soviet 
Government had publicly declared its willingness to stand up 
for Czechoslovakia against Germany in accordance with the terms 
.of that treaty, which called for simultaneous action on the part 
of France in defense of Czechoslovakia. France, however, refused 
to discharge her duty. 
Notwithstanding all this, the Soviet Government declared on 
the eve of the Munich deal that it was in favor of convening an 
international conference to render practical . aid to Czechoslovakia 
and to take practical measures for the preservation of peace. When 
the seizure of Czechoslovakia became an accomplished fact, and 
the governments of the imperialist countries, one after another, de-
. cia red their recognition of the accomplished fact, the Soviet Gov-
ernment, in its note of March 18, branded the seizure of Czecho-
slovakia by Hitlerite Germany, which was accomplished with the 
aid of Britain and France, as a wanton act of violence and ag-
greSSIon. 
In that note, the Soviet Government stressed that by her acts 
24 Sayers and Kahn, The Great Conspirfl~Y: ThQ SQ~rQt War Against Soviet 
Ruui4, :6Qston, 1946, pp. 324-325, 
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Germany had created and aggravated the ·menace to universal 
peace, had "upset political stability in Central Europe, had in-
creased the elements of the atmosphere of alarm created in Europe 
still earlier, and had inflicted a fresh injury to the fee1.ing of 
security of nations. "25 
But the handing over -of Czechoslovakia to Hitler was not the 
end of the business. The Governments of Britain and France were, 
each of them, eager to be first to sign broad political agreements 
with Hitlerite Germany. The Anglo-German declaration was 
signed in Munich on September 30, 1938, by Chamberlain and 
Hitler. This declaration said: . 
"We have continued today our conversation and have unani-
mously come to the conviction that Anglo-German relations are 
of paramount importance to both countries and to Europe. We 
regard the agreement signed last evening and the Anglo-Ger-
man Naval Agreement as symbolizing. the desire of both our 
peoples never again to wage war against each other . We are 
resolved to consider other questions, too, which concern both 
our countries, by means of consultation and to strive in the 
future to eliminate all causes generating discord, so as to facili-
tate the safeguarding of peace in Europe."26 
That was Britain's and Germany's declaration on mutual non-
aggression. The Bonnet-Ribbentrop Franco-German declaration, 
similar to the Anglo·-German one, was signed on December 6, 
1938. It stated that the German and French Governments were 
unanimous in their belief that peaceful and good-neighborly rela-
tions between Germany and France constitute the most essential 
condition for the consolidation of relations in Europe, and for 
maintenance of the general peace, and that both Governments will 
do their utmost to secure the preservation of such relations b~tween 
their countries. The declaration further asserted that between 
France and Germany there were no longer any controversial ques-
tions of a territorial nature, and that the then existing boundary 
between the two countries was final. 
2fi Izvestia, March 20, 1939. 
26 Deutsch-Englische El'klal'ung, Munchen, September 30, 1938, Archiv 
fur Aussenpolitik und Landerkunde, April 1938-Marz 1939, S. 483. 
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The declaration concluded by saying that both Governments 
were firmly resolved, without reference to their specific relations 
with third Powers, to maintain contact with each other on all 
matters concerning their countries, and to confer with each other 
should later development of these matters lead to international 
complications. 
That was France's and Germany's declaration on mutual non-
aggression. Essentially, these agreements meant that both Britain 
and France concluded non-aggression pacts with Hitler. These 
agreements with Hitlerite Germany revealed with perfect clarity 
that the British and French Governments, in their desire to ward 
off the menace of Hitlerite aggression from their countries, be-
lieved that the Munich agreement and similar other ones flung the 
gates wide open for Hitlerite aggression in the East, aggression 
against the Soviet Union. It was thus that the political conditions 
for "uniting Europe without Russia" were created. What they 
were after was the complete isolation of the Soviet Union. 
3. The Isolation of the Soviet Union. The Soviet-German Non-
Aggression Pact 
AFTER the seizure of Czechoslovakia fascist Germany proceeded with her preparations for war quite openly, before the eyes 
of the whole world. Hitler, encouraged by Britain and France, 
no longer stood on ceremony or pretended to favor the peaceful 
settlement of European problems. The most dramatic months of 
the prewar period had come. At that time it was already clear 
that every day was bringing mankind nearer to the unparalleled 
catastrophe of war. 
What was, at that time, the policy of the Soviet Union on the 
one hand, and of Great Britain and France on the other? 
The attempt of the falsifiers of history in the United States of 
America to avoid answering this question merely goes to prove 
that their consciences are not clear. 
The truth is that even during the fatal period of the spring 
and summer of 1939, on the threshold of war, Britain and 
France, supported by ruling circles in the United States, continued 
the former course of their policy. This was a policy of provocative 
incitement of Hitler Germany against the Soviet Union, camou .. 
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Raged not only with pharisaical phrases about their readiness to 
cooperate with the Soviet Union, but also with certain simple 
diplomatic maneuvers intended to conceal the real character of 
their policy from world public opinion. 
Among such maneuvers were, in the first place, the '1939 nego-
tiations which Britain and France decided to open with the Soviet 
Union. In order to deceive public opinion, the ruling circles in 
Britain and France tried to depict these negotiations as a serious 
attempt to prevent the further extension of Hitlerite aggression. 
In the light of all the subsequent developments, however, it be-
came perfectly clear that so far as the Anglo-French side was 
concerned, these negotiations were from the very beginning noth-
ing but another move in their double game. 
This was also clear to the leaders of Hitler Germany, for whom 
the meaning of the negotiations with the Soviet Union, under-
taken by the Governments of Britain and France, was certainly 
no secret. Here, for example, is what the German Ambassador 
to London, Dirksen, wrote in his report to the German Foreign 
Ministry on August 3, 1939, as is evident from documents cap-
tured by the Soviet Army during the defeat of Hitler Germany: 
"The prevailing impression 'here was that [Britain's] ties 
with other states formed during the recent months were only a 
reserve means for a real reconciliation with Germany and that 
these ties would cease to exist as soon as the one' important aim, 
worthy of effort-an agreement with Germany-was achieved." 
This opinion was firmly shared by all German diplomats who 
watched the situation in London. 
In another secret report to Berlin, Dirksen wrote: 
"By means of armaments and the acquisition of allies, Brit-
ain wants to gain strength and to catcn up with the Axis, but at 
the same time she wants to try to reach an amicable agreement 
with Germany by means of negotiations." 27 
The slanderers and falsifiers of history are trying to keep these 
documents hidden since they shed a bright light on the situation 
during the last prewar months, without correct assessment of 
27 Dirksen's memorandum On the Development of Political Relations 
between Germany and Britain during my Term of Office in LondQn, com-
piled in September 1939. 
which it would be impossible to understand the true prehistory of 
the war. By undertaking negotiations with the Soviet Union and 
giving guarantees to Poland, Romania and certain other states, 
Britain and France, with the support of the ruling circles in the 
United States, played a double game calculated to lead to an 
agreement with Hitler Germany, for the purpose of directing her 
aggression to the East, against the Soviet Union. 
The negotiations between Britain and France on the one hand, 
and the Soviet Union on the other, began in March, 1939, and 
continued for about four month's. 
The whole course of these negotiations showed with perfect 
clarity that whereas the Soviet Union was trying to reach a broad 
agreement with the Western Powers on the basis of equality, 
. an agreement capable of preventing Germany, even though at the 
last 'moment, from starting a war in Europe, the Governments of 
Britain and France, relying on support in the United States, set 
themselves entirely different aims. The ruling circles in Britain 
and France, accustomed to having others pull their chestnuts out 
of the fire, on this occasion too attempted to foist obligations upon 
the Soviet Union under which the USSR would have taken upon 
itself the brunt of the sacrifice in repulsing a possible Hitler ag-
gression, while Britain and France would not bind themselves by 
any commitment to the Soviet Union. 
If the rulers of Britain and France had succeeded in ' this 
maneuver they would have come much closer to attaining their 
basic aim, which was to get Germany and the Soviet Union to 
come to grips as quickly as possible. The Soviet Government, how-
ever, saw through this scheme, and at all stages in the negotiations 
it countered the diplomatic trickery and subterfuges of the West-
ern Powers with its clear and frank proposals intended to serve 
but one purpose-the safeguarding of peace in Europe. 
There is no need to recall all the vicissitudes through which 
the negotiations went. We need only bring to mind a few of the 
more important points. It suffices to recall the terms put forward 
during the negotiations by the Soviet Government: the conclusion 
of an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression between 
Britain, France, and the USSR; the granting of a guarantee by 
Britain, France, and the USSR to states of Central and Eastern 
29 
Europe, including all the European countries bordering on the 
USSR, without exception; the conclusion of a concrete military 
agreement between Britain, France, and the USSR on the forms 
and volume of immediate effective aid to each other and to the 
guaranteed states in the ~vent of an attack by aggressors.28 
At the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 
May 31, 1939, V. M. Molotov pointed out that some of the 
Anglo-French proposals moved during those negotiations had con-
tained none of the ~lementary principles of reciprocity and equal-
ity of obligations, indispensable for all agreements between equals. 
"While guaranteeing themselves," said V. M. Molotov, "from 
direct attack on the part of aggressors by mutual assistance pacts 
between themselves and with Poland and while trying to secure 
for themselves the assistance of the USSR in the event of an at-' 
tack by aggressors on Poland and Romania, the British and French 
left open the question of whether the USSR in its turn might 
count on their assistance in the event of its being directly at-
tacked by aggressors, just as they left open another question, 
namely, whether they could participate in guaranteeing the small 
states bordering on the USSR and covering its northwestern 
frontier, should these states prove unable to defend their neutrality 
from attack by aggressors. Thus, the position was one of inequality 
for the USSR." 
Even when the British and French representatives gave verbal 
consent to the principle of mutual assistance on terms of reciproc-
ity between Britain, France, and the USSR in the event of a 
direct attack by an aggressor, they hedged it in with a number 
of reservations which rendered this consent fictitious. 
In addition to this, the Anglo-French proposals provided for 
help on the part of the USSR to those countries to which the 
British and French had given promises of guarantees, but they 
said nothing about their own help for the countries on the north-
western frontier of the USSR, the Baltic States, in the event of an 
aggressor attacking them. · 
In view of the above-mentioned considerations. V. M. Molo-
tov announced that th~ Soviet Union could not undertake obliga-
28 Report by V. M. Molotov to the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR, May 31, 1939. 
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tions with respect to some countri~s unless similar guarantees \yere 
given with respect to the countries situated on the northwestern 
frontier of the Soviet Union. 
It should also be remembered that when, on March 18, 1939, 
Seeds, the British Ambassador to Moscow, asked the People's 
Commissar of Foreign Affairs 'W-hat the , Soviet Union's position 
would be in the event of Hitler's aggression against Romania-
concerning the preparation of which the British possessed infor-
mation-and when the question was then raised by the Soviet side 
as to what Britain's position would be under those circumstances, 
Seeds evaded reply, stating that Romania was geographically 
closer to the Soviet Union than it was to England. 
Thus, from the very first step, it was already quite clear that 
British ruling circles were endeavoring to bind the Soviet Union to 
definite obligations, while they themselves would stand aloof. This 
artless method ~as then again and again repeated regularly throug-
out the whole course of the negotiations. 
In reply to the British inquiry, the Soviet Government suggested 
that a conference be called of representatives of the most interested 
states-namely Great Britain, France, Romania, Poland, Turkey, 
and the Soviet Union. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, 
such a conference would offer the best opportunities for ascertain-
ing the real state of affairs and for determining the positions of all 
the participants. The British Government, however, replied that 
it believed the Soviet proposal to be premature. 
Instead of calling a conference which would have made it possi-
ble to agree on concrete measures to combat aggression, the British 
Government on March 21, 1939 proposed to the Soviet Govern-
ment the signing, together with it as well as with France and 
Poland, a declaration in which the signatory governments would 
undertake to "consult together as to what steps should be taken to 
offer joint resistance" in the event of a threat to "the independence 
of any European state." 
In arguing that this proposal was acceptable, the British Am-
bassador laid particular emphasis 'on the point that the declaration 
was couched in terms which involved hardly any commitments. 
It was quite obvious that such a declaration could not s,erve as 
an effective means of fighting the impending threat on the part of 
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the aggressor. Believing, however, that even a declaration promising 
so little might constitute at least some step forward in the matter 
of 'curbing the aggressor, the Soviet Government consented to the 
British proposal. But already on April), 1939 the British Am-
bassador in Moscow communicated the information that Britain 
considered the question of a joint declaration as having lapsed. 
After two more weeks of procrastination, the British Foreign 
Secretary, Halifax, thro,:!gh the medium of the Ambassador in 
Moscow, made another proposal to the Soviet Government to the 
effect that the Soviet Government should issue a declaration saying 
that "in the event of an act of aggression against any European-
neighbor of the Soviet Union, who would offer resistance, the 
assistance of the Soviet Government could be counted upon if 
desired." 
What this proposal meant was mainly that in the event of an 
act of aggression on the part of Germany against Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, or Finland, the Soviet Union would be obliged to render 
them assistance without any obligation on the part of Britain to 
render assistance-i.e., for the Soviet Union to become involved in 
a war with Germany singlehanded. In the case of Poland_ and 
Romania, too, who did receive Britain's guarantees, the Soviet 
Union was to ren~er them assistance against an aggressor; but 
even in their case Britain refused to assume any obligations jointly 
with the Soviet U nion,- leaving herself a free hand and a field for 
maneuvers of any kind, not to mention the fact that, according to 
this proposal, Poland and -Romania as well as the Baltic States 
assumed no obligations whatever with respect to the USSR. 
The Soviet Government, however, did not want to miss any 
opp0t:tunity to bring about agreement with other Powers for a joint -
struggle against Hitler's aggression. Without the least delay it 
presented to the British Government its counterproposal which 
consisted of the following: 
( 1) That the Soviet Union, Britain and France should mutually 
undertake to render one another immediate assistance of every 
kind, including military, in the event of aggression against one of 
these states; -
(2) That the Soviet Union, Britian, and France should under-
take to render any kind of assistance, including military, to 
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the states of Eastern Europe situated between the Baltic and the 
Black Seas and bordering on the Soviet Union, in the event of 
aggression against these states; and 
(3) The Soviet Union, Britain and France were to under-
take to determine within a short space of time the volume and 
forms of military assistance to be rendered to each of these 
states in both cases mentioned above. 
These were the most important points of the ' Soviet proposal. 
It is not hard to see that there was a fundamental difference be-
tween the Soviet and British proposals, inasmuch as the Soviet 
proposal provided for really effective measures for joint counter-
action to aggression. 
No reply to that proposal came from the British Government 
for three weeks. This caused growing anxiety in Britian, owing 
to which the British Government felt constrained in the end 
to resort to a new maneuver in order to deceive public opinion. 
On May 8 the British reply, or, to be more exact the British 
counterproposals, were received in Moscow. It was again pro-
posed that the Soviet Government should make a unilateral 
declaration in which it "would undertake that in the event of 
Great Britain and France being involved in hostilities in fulfill-
ment of these obligations" [to Belgium, Poland, Romania, Greece, 
and Turkey] "tlie assistance of the Soviet Government would 
be immediately available if desired and would be afforded in such 
manner and on such terms as might be agreed." 
Once again the Soviet Union was expected to assume unilateral 
obligations. It was to undertake to render assistance to Britain 
and -France who on their part assumed no obligations what-
ever to the Soviet Union with regard to the Baltic Republics. 
Britain thus suggested that the USSR be placed in an unequal 
position, unacceptable 'to and incompatible with the dignity of 
any independent state. 
It is easy to see that actually the British proposal was ad-
dressed not so much to Moscow as to Berlin. The Germans 
were inyited to attack the Soviet Union, and were given to 
unoerstand that Britain and France would maintain neutrality 
if only the Germans attacked through the Baltic States. 
On May 11 the negotiations between the Soviet Union, Britain, 
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and France w~re further complicated by a statement made by the 
Polish Ambassador in Moscow, Grzybowski, to the effect that 
"Poland does not consider it possible to conclude a pact of mutual 
assistance with the USSR ... " 
Naturally, such a statement could only be made by the Polish 
representative with the knowledge and approval of the ruling 
circles of Britian and France. 
The behavior of the British and French representatives in the 
Moscow negotiations was so provocative that even in the ruling 
camp of the Western Powers there were some who sharply 
criticized this crude game. Thus, Lloyd George published a 
sharp article in the French newspaper Ce Soir in the summer of 
1939 directed · against the makers of British policy. Referring 
to the causes of the endless procrastination in which the negotia-
tions between Britain and France on the one hand, and the 
Soviet Union on the other, were stuck, Lloyd George wrote 
that there could be only one answer to that question: "Neville 
Chamberlain, Halifax, and John Simon do not want any agree-
ment with Russia whatever." 
It goes without saying that what was obvious to Lloyd 
George was no less obvious to the bosses of Hitler Germany, who 
understood perfectly that the Western Powers had no intention 
of reaching a serious agreement with the Soviet Union, but were 
pursuing an entirely different aim. That aim was to spur Hitler 
on to hurry with his attack upon the Soviet Union, guaranteeing 
him a premium, as it were, for such an attack by placing the 
Soviet Union in the least favorable conditions in the event of 
a war with Germany. 
Furthermore, the Western Powers dragged out the negotatiops 
with the Soviet Union endlessly, seeking to drown major issues 
in a swamp of minor amendments and innumerable versions. 
Each time the question of some real obligations came up, the 
representatives of these Powers pretended not to understand 
what it was all about. 
Toward the end of May, Britain and France made new pro-
posals which somewhat improved the previous version, but still 
left open a question of essential importance to the Soviet Union 
-namely, the question of guarantees for the three Baltic Re-
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publics situated on the northwestern frontier of the Soviet Union. 
Thus, the rulers of Britain and France, while making certain 
verbal concessions under the pressure of public opinion in their 
countries, stuck to their previous line and hedged in their pro-
posals with such reservations as they knew would make them 
unacceptable to the -Soviet Union. 
The behavior of the British and French representatives in 
the negotiations at Moscow was so intolerable that on May 27, 
1939, V. M. Molotov had to tell British Ambassador Seeds and 
French Charge d'Affairs Payard that their draft agreement for 
joint counteraction to an aggressor in Europe did not contain 
a plan for the organization of effective mutual assistance of the 
USSR, Britain, and France, and that it did not even indicate that 
the British and French Governments were seriously interested 
in a corresponding pact with the Soviet Union. 
I t was further plainly stated that the Anglo-French proposal 
led one to think that the Governments of Britain and France 
were not- so much interested in the pact itself as in talk about 
a pact. Possibly Britain and France needed this talk for some 
aims of their own. The Soviet Government did not know what 
these aims were. The Soviet Government was interested, not 
in talk about a pact, but in organizing effective mutual as-
sistance of the USSR, Britain, and France against aggression 
in Europe. The British and French representatives were warned 
that the Soviet Government did not intend to take part in talk 
about a pact, the aim of which the USSR did not know, and 
that the British and French Governments might find more 
suitable partners for such talk than the USSR. 
The Moscow negotiations dragged on endlessly. The London 
Times blurted out the reasons for this inadmissible procrastina-
tion when it wrote: 
"A hard and fast alliance with Russia would hamper other 
negotiations." 29 
In referring to "other negotiations" the Times apparently im-
plied the negotiations which Robert Hudson, Minister of Overseas 
Trade, was conducting with Dr. Helmut Wohltat, Hitler's 
, 
29 Sayers and Kahn, The Great Conspiracy: The Secret War against Soviet 
Russia, Boston, 1946, p. 329. 
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economic adviser, on the possibility of a very large British loan 
to Hitler Germany, of which more anon. Besides, as is known 
from press reports, on the ,day that Hitler's army entered Prague, 
a delegation of the Federation of British Industries conducted 
negotiations in Dusseldorf with a view to concluding an ex-
tensive agreement with big German industries. 
A circumstance that attracted attention at the time was that 
men of secondary importance were sent to conduct the negotia-
tions on behalf of Great Britain in Moscow, while Chamberlain 
himself went to Germany to carryon negotiations with Hitler, 
and that on several occasions. It is also important to note that 
the British representative for the negotiations with the USSR, 
Strang, had no authority to sign any agreement with the Soviet 
Union. 
In view of the demand of the Soviet Union that the parties 
should proceed to concrete negotiations concerning measures 
to fight a possible aggressor, the Governments of Britain and 
France had to consent to send their military missions to Moscow. 
But it took those missions an unusually long time to get to Mos-
cow, and when they did get there, it transpired that they were 
composed of men of secondary importance who, furthermore, 
had not been authorized to sign any agreement. That being the 
case, the military negotiations proved to be as futile as the 
political ones. 
The military missions of the Western Powers demonstrated at 
once that they even had no desire to carryon serious conversa-
tions concerning means of mutual assistance in the event of 
aggression on the part of Germany. The Soviet military mission 
proceeded from the fact that, since the USSR had no common 
border with Germany, it could render Britain, France, 'and Po-
land assistance in the event of war only if Soviet troops were 
permitted to pass through Polish territority. The Polish Govern-
ment, however, declared that it would accept no milita,ry assistance 
from the Soviet Union, thus showing that it feared the growth 
of strength of the Soviet Union more than Hitler's aggression. 
Both the British and French missions supported Poland's posi-
tion. 
In the course of the military negotiations, the question also 
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came up as to the strength of the armed forces which should be 
put in the field at once by the parties to the agreement in the 
event of aggression. The British named a ridiculous figure, stating 
that they could put in the field five infantry divisions and one 
mechanized division. That was what the British offered at a 
time when the Soviet Union declared that it was prepared to 
send to the front against the aggressor one hundred and thirty-
. six divisions, five thousand medium and heavy guns, up to ten 
thousand tanks and whippets, more than five thousand war planes, 
etc. The above shows with what an utter lack: of seriousness the 
British Government treated the negotiations for a military 
agreement with the USSR. 
The facts cited above fully bear out the conclusion that sug-
gests itself, and this conclusion is as follows: 
( 1 ) Throughout the negotiations the Soviet Government 
strove with the utmost patience to secure agreement with Britain 
and France for mutual assistance against an aggressor on a basis 
of equality and on the condition that the mutual assistance 
would be really effective, i.e., that the signing of a political 
agreement would be accompanied by the signing of a military 
convention establishing the volume, form"s, and time limits of the 
assistance, as all the preceding events had shown clearly enough 
that only such an agreement could be effective and might brinOg 
the Hitlerite aggressQr to his senses, encouraged though he was 
by complete impunity and by the connivance of the Western 
B wers during the course of many years. 
(2) Britain's and France's behavior during the negotiations 
with the Soviet V nion fully confirmed that a serious agree-
ment was farthest from their thoughts, since British and French 
policy was guided by other aims which had nothing in com-
mon with the interests of peace and the fight against aggression. 
(3) The perfidious purpose of Anglo-French policy was to 
give Hitler to understand that the USSR had no allies, that 
the USSR was isolated, that h~ could attack: the USSR without 
running the risk: of encountering the resistance of Britain and 
France. 
It was no wonder, therefore, that Anglo-French-Soviet ne-
gotia tions ended in failure. 
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There was, of course, nothing fortuitious about that failure. 
I t was becoming ever more obvious that the breakdown of the 
negotiations had been planned beforehand by the representatives 
of the Western Powers in their double game. The point was that, 
along with open negotiation with the USSR, the British con-
ducted backstage negotiations with Germany" and they attached 
incomparably greater importance to the latter. 
Whereas, by their negotiations in Moscow, the ruling circles 
of the Western Powers sought primarily to lull the vigilance 
of the public in their countries, to deceive the peoples that were 
being drawn into war, the negotiations with the Hiderites were 
of an entirely different nature. 
The program of the Anglo-German negotiations was formulated 
plainly enough by the British Foreign Secretary, Halifax, who was 
addressing unequivocal appeals to Hitler Germany at the very time 
his officials continued negotiations in Moscow. In a speech at a 
banquet of The Royal Institute of International Affairs on 
June 29, 1939, Halifax expressed a readiness to come to terms with 
Germany on all the problems "that are today causing wo~ld 
anxiety." He said: 
"In such a new atmosphere we could examine the colonial 
problem, the problem of raw materials, trade barriers, the issue 
of Lebensraum" the limitation of armaments and any other issue 
that affects the lives of all European citizens."3o 
If we recall how the conservative Daily Mail which is close 
to Halifax, treated the problem of Lebensraum as far back s 
1933 when it suggested to the H _itlerites that they should wrest 
Lebensraum from the USSR, there remains not the slightest 
doubt as to what Halifax really meant. It was an open offer to 
Hitler Gennany to come to terms for a division of the world and 
of the spheres of influence, an offer to settle all the questions 
without the Soviet Union and mainly at the expense of the 
Soviet Union. 
As early as June, 1939, British representatives inaugurated 
strictly confidential negotiations with Germany through Hitler's 
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, Wohltat, who had come 
80 Viscount Halifax: Speeches on FOfeign PQli~1 19)4-1939~ Q~fQtd 
University Press, London, 1940, p. 296. 
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to London. Conversations were carried on with him by the Minis-
ter of Overseas Trade, Hudson, and Chamberlain's closest adviser, 
G. Wilson. The substance of those June negotiations ' is still 
buried in the recesses of diplomatic archives. But in July, Wohltat 
paid another visit to London and the negotiations were resumed. 
The contents of that second round of negotiations are now 
known from captured German documents in the hands of the 
Soviet Government, which will soon be made public. 
Hudson and G. Wilson suggested to Wohltat, and later to 
the German Ambassador in London, Dirksen, the starting of 
secret negotiations for a broad agreement, which was to include 
an agreement for the division of spheres of influence on a 
world-wide scale, and for the . elimination of "deadly competition 
in the general markets." It was envisaged that Germany 'would 
be allowed predominating influence in southeastern' Europe. In 
a report to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 
July 21, 1939, Dirksen pointed out that the program discussed 
by W ohltat and Wilson comprised political, military, and eco-
monic issues. Among the political issues a special place, along 
with a pact of non-aggression, was assigned to a pact of non-
intervention which was to provide for a "delimitation of Leben-
sraum between the great Powers, particularly between Britain 
and Germany." 31 
During the discussion of the questions involved in these two 
pacts, the British representatives promised that, in the event 
these pacts were signed, Britain would renounce the guarantees 
she had just given Poland. 
In case an Anglo-German agreement was signed, the British 
were prepared to let the Germans settle the Danzig prob-
lem and that of the Polish Corridor with Poland alone, under-
taking not to interfere in the settlement. 
Further-and this too finds a documentary confirmation in 
Dirksen's reports which will shortly be published-Wilson re-
affirmed that in case the abovementioned pacts between Britain 
and Germany were signed, the British policy of giving guarantees 
would be virtually abolished. 
11 Memorandum of the German Ambassador to Britain, Dirksen, of 
July 21, 1939. Archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
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"Then Poland," says Dirksen on this point in his report, 
"would be left, so to say, alone, !ace to face with Germany." 
All this meant that the rulers of Britain were prepared to 
surrender Poland to Hitler as his prey, at a time when the ink 
with which Britain's guarantees to Poland had been signed 
had not dried. At the same time, if the Anglo-German agree:.. 
ment had been concluded, the purpose which Britain and France 
had set themselves in starting the negotiations with the Soviet 
Union would have been achieved and the possibility of expedit-
ing a clash between Germany and the USSR ·would have been 
further facilitated. . 
Lastly, it was proposed to supplement the political agreement 
between Britain and Germany by an economic agreement which 
would include a secret deal on colonial questions, on the dis-
tribution of raw materials, on the division of markets, as well 
as on a big British loan for Germany. 
Thus, the rulers of Britain saw an alluring picture of a stable 
agreement with Germany and the so-called "canalization" of 
German aggression toward the East, against Poland to whom 
they had but recently given a "guarantee" and against the Soviet 
Union. 
Is it to be wondered at that the slanderers and falsifiers of his-
tory carefully hush up and try to conceal these facts of decisive 
importance to an understanding of the situation in which war 
was thus becoming inevitab e? 
By this time there was -already no doubt left that, far from in-
tending to make any serious attempt to prevent Hitler Ger-
many from starting the war, Britain and France, on the con-
trary, were doing everything within their power, by means 
of secret deals and agreements, by means of every possible kind 
of provocation, to incite Hitler Germany against the Soviet Union. 
No forgers will ever succeed in wiping from history or from 
the consciousness of the peoples the decisive fact that under 
these conditions, the Soviet Union faced the alternative: either 
to accept, for purposes of self defense, Germany's proposal to 
conclude a non-aggression pact and t~ereby to ensure to the 
Soviet Union the prolongation of peace for a certain period of 
time~ which might be used by the Soviet State better to prepare 
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its forces for resistance to a possible attack on the part of an 
aggressor; or to reject Germany's proposal for a non-aggression 
pact and thereby to permit war provocateurs from the camp 
of the Western Powers immediately to involve the Soviet Union 
in armed conflict with Germany at a time when the situation was 
utterly unfavorable to the Soviet Union and when it was 
completely isolated. 
In this situation, the Soviet Government found itself com- . 
pelled to make its choice and conclude a non-aggression pact 
with Germany. 
This choice was a wise and far-sighted act of Soviet foreign 
policy under the conditions which then obtained. This step 
of the Soviet Government to an enormous extent predetermined 
the favorable outcome of the Second World War for the Soviet 
Union and for all the freedom-loving peoples. 
I t would be a gross slander to assert that the conclusion of 
a pact with the Hitlerites was part of the plan of the foreign policy 
of the USSR. On the contrary, the USSR strove at all times to 
have an agreement with the Western non-aggressive states 
against the German and Italian aggressors for the achievement 
of collective security on the basis of equality. But there must 
be two parties to an agreement. 
Whereas the USSR insisted on an agreement for combating 
aggression, Britain and France systematically rejected it, pre-
ferring to pursue a policy of isolating the USSR, a policy of 
concessions t~ the aggressors, a policy of directing aggression 
to the East, against the USSR. 
The United States of America, far from counteracting that 
ruinous policy, backed it in every way. As for the American 
billionaires, they went on investing their capital in German heavy 
industrie~, helping the Germans to expand .their war industries, 
and thu~ supplying German aggression with arms. They might 
as well be saying: "Go on, Messrs. Europeans, wage war to 
your hearts' content; wage war with God's help; while we, 
modest American billionaires, will accumulate wealth out of your 
war, making hundreds 'of millions of dollars in super-profits." 
Naturally, with this state ~of affairs in Europe, there only 
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remained one way out for the Soviet Union: to accept the 
German proposal for a pact. This was, after all, the best of all 
the possible ways out. 
Just as in 1918, owing to the hostile policy of the Western 
Powers, the Soviet Union was forced to conclude the Brest 
Peace with the Germans, so in 1939, twenty years after the 
Peace of Brest, the Soviet Union was compelled to conclude 
a pact with the Germans, owing to the same hostile policy of 
Britain and France. 
The claptrap of slanderers of all hues to the effect that the 
- USSR should in no case have allowed itself to conclude a 
pact with the Germans can only be regarded as ridiculous. Why 
could Poland, who had Britain and France as allies, conclude 
a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1934, and the Soviet 
Union, enjoying less favorable conditions, could not conclude 
a similar pact in 1939? Why could Britain and France, who 
were the dominant force in Europe, issue jointly with the Ger-
mans a declaration on non-aggression in 1938, and the Soviet 
Union, isolated because of the hostile policy of Britain and France, 
could not conclude a . pact with the Germans? 
Is it not a fact that of all the non-aggressive great Powers in 
Europe the Soviet Union was the last to make a pact with the 
Germans? 
Of course, the falsifiers of history and other reactionaries are 
displeased with the fact that the Soviet Union succeeded ' in 
making _good use of the Soviet-German pact to strengthen its 
defenses; that it succeeded in moving its frontiers far to the 
West and in barring the way of the unhampered eastward ad-
vance of German aggression; that Hitler's troops had to begin 
their offensive to the East, not from the N arva-Minsk-Kiev 
line, but from a line hundreds of kilometers farther west; that 
the USSR ,,-as not bled to death in the Patriotic War, but 
emerged victorious· from that war. This displeasure, however, 
should be regarded as a manifestation of tile impotent rage of 
bankrupt politicians. 
The vicious displeasuure of these gentlemen can only be re-
garded as a demonstration of the indubitable fact that the policy 
of the Soviet Union has been and remains a correct policy. 
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4. The ,Creation of An "Eastern" Front, Germany's Attack 
Upon The USSR; The Anti-Hitler Coalition and The Question of 
Inter-Allied Obligations. 
W HEN concluding the pact of non-aggression with Germany in August, 1939, the Soviet Union did not doubt for a mo-
ment that sooner or later Hitler would attack: it. This certainty 
was based on the fundamental political and . military policies of 
the Hitlerites. It was borne out by the practical activities of 
the Hitler Government throughout the pr{!war period. 
That was why the first task of the Soviet Government was 
to create an "Eastern" front against Hitler's aggression, to 
build up a defense line along the western frontiers of the Bye-
lorussian and Ukrainian Republics and thus to set up a barrier 
to prevent an unhindered advance of the German troops eastward. 
To do this it was necessary to reunite Western Byelorussia and 
Western Ukraine which the Poland of the .gentry had seized 
in 1920, with Soviet Byelorussia and the Soviet Ukraine, and 
to move Soviet troops there. This matter brooked no delay as 
the poorly equipped Polish troops proved to be unstable, the 
Polish command and the Polish Government were . already in full 
flight, and Hitler's troops, meeting no serious obstacles, could 
occupy the Byelorussian and Ukrainian territories before Soviet 
troops got there. 
On September 17, 1939, the Soviet troops, at the order of 
the Soviet Government, crossed the prewar Soviet-Polish border, 
occupied Western Byelorussia and Western Ukraine and pro-
ceeded to build defenses there along the western line of the 
Ukrainian and Byelorussian territories. In the main, it was the 
line which is know in hstory as the "Curzon Line" established 
at the Versailles Conference of the Allies. 
A few days later the Soviet Government signed pacts of 
mutual assistance with the Baltic States, providing for the 
stationing of Soviet Army garrisons on the territory of Estonia, 
Latvia, and · Lithuania, the organization of Soviet air fields and 
the building of naval bases there. 
Thus the foundation was· laid for the "Eastern" front. 
It was not hard to see that the creation of an "Eastern" front 
was an important contribution not only to the organization of 
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the security of the USSR but to the common cause of the peace-
loving states that were fighting against Hitler's aggression. N ever-
theless, the answer of Anglo-Franco-American circles, in their 
overwhelming majority, to this step of the Soviet Government 
was to start a malicious anti-Soviet campaign, describing the 
Soviet action as aggression. 
There were some political leaders, however, sufficiently dis-
cerning to understahd the meaning of the Soviet policy and to 
. admit that it was the right thing to create an "Eastern" front. 
First among them was Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the 
Admiralty, who in his radio speech on October 1, 1939, after 
a number of unfriendly sallies against the Soviet Union, stated: 
"That the Russian armies should stand on this line was 
clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi 
menace. At any rate, the line is there and an Eastern front 
has been created which Nazi Germany does not dare assail. 
When Herr von Ribbentrop was summoned to Moscow last 
week, it was to learn the fact and to accept the fact that the 
Nazi designs upon the Baltic States and upon the Ukraine 
must come to a dead stop." 
While the situation with regard to the security of the USSR 
was more or less satisfactory on the western frontiers, at a con-
siderable distance from Moscow, Minsk, and Kiev, the same 
could not be said about the northern frontier of the USSR. Here, 
at a distance of some 32 kilometers from Leningrad, stood Fin-
nish troops, the majority of whose commanding officers oriented 
themselves toward Hitler Germany. The Soviet Government 
was well aware of the fact that the fascist elements among the 
ruling circles of Finland, who were closely connected with the 
Hitlerites and who wielded strong influence in the Finnish Army, 
were striving to capture Leningrad. The fact that Halder, the 
Chief of the General Staff of Hitler's Army, arrived in the sum-
mer of 1939 in Finland to instruct the highest leaders of the 
Finnish Army, could not be regarded as a mere accident. There 
could hardly be any doubt that the leading circles of Finland 
were in league with the Hitlerites, that they wanted to turn Fin-
land into a springboard for Hitler Germany's attack upon the 
USSR. 
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I t is therefore not surprising that all the attempts of the USSR 
to find a common language with the Finnish Government with a 
view to improving relations between the two countries remained 
futile. 
The Government of Finland declined, one after another, all 
the friendly proposals of the Soviet Government, the purpose of 
which was to guarantee the security of the USSR, particularly 
of Leningrad-and this in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union 
was willing to meet Finland halfway and to satisfy her legitimate 
interests. 
The Finnish Government declined the proposal of the USSR 
to move the Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus a few dozen 
kilometers, although the Soviet Government was willing to com-
pensate Finland with an area twice as large in 'Soviet Karelia. 
The· Finnish Government also declined the proposal of the 
USSR to conclude a pact of mutual assistance, thereby demon-
strating that the security of the USSR from the direction of Fin-
land remained unguaranteed. 
By these and similar hostile actions and provocations on the 
Soviet-Finnish border, Finland unleashed the war against the 
Soviet Union. 
The results of the Soviet-Finnish War are known. The fron-
tiers of the USSR in the northwest and particularly in the Len-
ingrad area were shifted further away and the security of the 
USSR was strengthened. This played an important part in the 
defense of the Soviet Union against Hitler's aggression, inas-
much as Hitler Germany and her Finnish accomplices had to 
begin their offensive in the northwest of the USSR, not in close 
proximity to Leningrad, but from a line nearly 150 kilometers 
to the northwest of it. 
In his speech at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 
on March 29, 1940, V. M. Molotov said: 
". . . the Soviet Union having smashed the Finnish Army 
and having had every opportunity to occupy the whole of Fin-
land did not do so and did not demand any indemnities for 
her war expenditure, as any other Power would have done, 
but confined her demands to a minimum. 
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" ... We pursued no other object in the Peace Treaty than 
that of safeguarding the security of Leningrad, M urmansk, 
and the Murmansk Railway." 
I t should be noted that although by their whole policy with 
regard to the USSR the Finnish ruling circles played into the 
hands of Hitler Germany, the Anglo-French bosses of the League -
of Nations immediately took the side of the Finnish Govern-
ment, declared through the League of Nations that the USSR 
was the "aggressor" and thereby openly approved and supported 
the war which the Finnish rulers had started against the Soviet 
Union. At the bidding of its Anglo-French bosses, the League of 
Nations, whiCh had disgraced itself by its connivance with and 
encouragement of the Japanese and German-Italian aggressors, 
obediently passed a resolution against the Soviet Union and 
demonstratively "expelled" the latter from its midst. 
But matters did not end there. In the war which the Finnish 
reactionaries started against the Soviet Union, Britain and France 
rendered the Finnish militarists every kind of assistance. The 
Anglo-French ruling circles kept inciting the Finnish Government 
to continue hostilities. 
The British and French rulers systematically supplied Finland 
with arms, and made energetic preparations to dispatch to Fin-
land an expeditionary corps a hundred thousand strong. 
In the three months that had passed since the beginning of the 
war, Britain, according to a statement made by Chamberlain in 
the House of Commons on March 19, 1940, delivered to Fin-
land 101 airplanes, over 200 artillery pieces, hundreds of thou-
sands of shells, aerial bombs and anti-tank mines. At the same 
time Daladier reported to the Chamber of Deputies that France 
had sent to Finland 175 airplanes, about 500 artillery' pieces, 
over 5,000 machine guns, 1,000,000 shells and hand grenades and 
various other arms. 
An exhaustive idea of the plans of the British and French Gov-
ernments at that time may be obtained from a memorandum 
handed by the British to the Swedes on March 2, 1940, which 
read: . 
"The Allied Governments understand that the military po-
sition of Finland is becoming desperate. After carefully con-
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sidering all the possibilities, they have reached the conclusion 
that the only means by which they can render effective help 
to Finland is by the dispatch of an Allied force, and they are 
prepared to send such a force in response to a Finnish appeal. "32 
At that time, as Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons 
on March 19, 
"Preparations for the expedition were carried on with all 
rapidity and at the beginning of March the expedition was 
ready to leave .... two months before Mannerheim had asked 
for it to arrive." 
Chamberlain added that this force reached 100,000 men in 
strength. 
At the sar:ne ~ime, the French Government was prepanng an 
expeditionary corps of 50,000 men-the first of a series-to be 
sent to Finland via N arvik. 
The British and French rulers were engaged in these bellicose 
activities at a time when Britain and France were absolutely in-
active on the front against Hitler Germany, at the time of "the 
phony war," as it was called . 
. But the military assistance to Finland against the Soviet Union 
was only part of a broader scheme of the British and French im-
perialists. . 
The above-mentioned' "White Paper" of the Swedish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs contains a document penned by the Swedish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Guenther. In this document we 
read that: 
"The dispatch of this force was part of the general plan of an 
attack upon the Soviet Union" and that beginning March 15, 
this plan "will be put into effect against Baku and still earlier 
through Finland. "33 
Henri de Kerillis, in his book, DeGaulleJ DictateurJ wrote the 
following about that plan: 
82 Note of the British Legation, dated March 2, 1940. (From the "White 
Paper" of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.) Stockholm~ 1947, 
p. 120. 
8SGunther's notes, March 2, 1940, the UWhite Paper" of the Swedish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, S~ockholm, 1947, p. 119. 
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"According to this plan, the main features of which were 
explained to me by Paul Reynaud34 in a letter which is · in my 
possession, the motorized expeditionary corps, after landing 
in Finland through Norway, would quickly disperse Russia's 
disorganized hordes and would march on ~eningrad . . ." 35 
In France this plan was drawn up by DeGaulle and General 
Weygand, who was then in command of the French troops in 
Syria, and who boasted that 
"with certain reinforcements and 200 airplanes he would seize 
the Caucasus and enter into Russia as a knife enters into but-
ter." 
It is also known that in 1940 the French General Gamelin 
worked out a plan for military operations to be conducted by the 
British and French against the · USSR, in which special atten-
tion was given to bombing Baku and Batumi. 
The preparations of the British and French rulers for an attack 
upon the USSR went on full blast. The General Staffs. of Britain 
and France were diligently drawing up plans for such an attack. 
Instead of waging war against ' Hitler Germany ~ these gentlemen 
wanted to start war against the Soviet Union. 
But those plans were not fated to materialize. At this time 
Finland was defeated by the Soviet troops and was forced to sur-
. render, in spite of all the efforts of Britain and France to pre-
vent her capitulation . 
. On March 12, 1940, the Soviet-Finnish Peace Treaty was 
signed. 
Thus the defense of the USSR against Hitlerite aggression 
was strengthened also in the north, in the Leningrad area, where 
the defense line was shifted to a distance of 150 kilometers north 
of Leningrad with Vyborg included. 
But this did not yet mean that the formation of an "Eastern" 
front from the Baltic to the Black Sea had been completed. Pacts 
had been concluded with the Baltic States, but there were as yet 
no Sovi~t troops there capable of holding the defenses. Moldavia 
and Bukovina had formally been reunited with the USSR, but 
84 Then a member of the French Government. 
85 Henri de Kerillis, De Gaulle, Dictateut'. Montreal, Edition Beau-
chemin, 1945, pp. 363-364. 
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there too, there were still no Soviet troops capable of holding the 
defenses. In the middle of June, 1940, Soviet troops entered 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. On June 27, 1940, Soviet troops 
entered Bukovina and Moldavia. The latter had been severed by 
Romania from the USSR after the October Revolution. 
Thus the formation of an "Eastern" front against Hitlerite 
aggression from the Baltic to the Black Sea was completed. 
The British and French ruling circles, which went on abusing 
the USSR and calling it an aggressor for creating an "Eastern" 
front, evidently did not realize that the appearance of an "East-
ern" front signified a radical tq.rn in the development of the war 
-a turn against Hitlerite tyranny, a turn in favor of a victory 
for democracy. 
They did not realize that it was not a question of infringing 
or not infringing upon the national rights of Finland, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Estonia, Poland, but that the point was to organize vic-
tory over the Nazis in order to prevent the conversion of those 
countries into disfranchised colonies of Hitler Germany. 
They did not realize that the point was to build up a barrier 
against the advance of the German troops wherever that was 
possible, to organize a strong defense and then to launch a coun-
teroffensive, smash the Hitlerite -troops and 'thereby create the 
opportunity for the free development of those countries. 
They did not realize that there existed no other way to defeat 
Hitler's aggression. 
Was the British Government right when it stationed its troops 
in Egypt during the war in spite of the protests of the Egyptians 
and even resistance on the part of certain elements in Egypt? 
Unquestionably it was right. That was a highly important means 
of barring the way to Hitler's aggression toward the Suez Canal, 
of safeguarding Egypt against Hitler's attempts, of organizing 
victory over Hitler, and thus averting the conversion of Egypt 
into a colony of Hitler Germany, Only enemies of democracy 
or people who have lost their senses can assert that the action of 
the British Government in that case constituted aggression. 
Was the United States Government right when it landed its 
troops at Casablanca in spite of the . protests of the Moroccans and 
of direct military counteraction on the part of the Petain Gov-
• 
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ernment of France whose authority extended to Morocco? U n-
questionably it was right. That was a highly important means of 
creating a base to counteract German aggression in immediate 
proximity to Western Europe, of organizing victory over Hitler's 
troops and thus creating the opportunity for liberating France 
from Hitler's colonial oppression. Only enemies of democracy or 
people who have lost their senses could regard these actions of 
American troops as aggression. 
But then the same must be said about the actions of the Soviet 
Government which by the summer of 1940 organized an "East-
ern" front against Hitlerite aggression and stationed its troops 
as far west as possible from Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev. That 
was the only means of barring the way of an unhindered advance 
of the German troops eastward, of building up strong defenses 
and then launching a counteroffensive in order. to smash, jointly 
with the Allies, Hitler's Army and thus prevent the conversion 
of peace-loving countries of Europe, among them Finland, Es-
tonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland into .colonies of Hitler Ger-
many. Only enemies of democracy or people who have lost their 
senses could describe those actions of the Soviet Government as . 
aggresSIon. 
But it follows . from this that Chamberlain, Daladier, and 
their entourage, who described this policy of the Soviet Govern-
ment as aggression , and organized the expulsion of the Soviet 
Union from the League of Nations, acted as enemies of democ-
racy or as people who had lost their senses. 
From this it follows, further, that the present-day slanderers 
and falsifiers of history who work in company with Messrs. Bevin 
and Bidault and describe the creation of an "Eastern" front 
against Hitler as aggression are also acting as enemies of democ-
cracy or as people who have lost their senses. 
What would have happened if, prior to Germany's attack, the 
USSR had not created an "Eastern" front far to the west of the 
old frontiers of the USSR, if that front had not been on the line 
Vyborg-Kaunas-Byelostok-Brest-Lvov, but had followed the old 
frontier-Leningrad-N arva-Minsk-Kiev? 
That would have given Hitler's forces an opportunity to win 
hundreds of kilometers, bringing the German front some two to 
• 
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three hundred kilometers nearer to Leningrad-Moscow-Minsk-
Kiev, greatly accelerating the Germans' advance into the in-
terior of the USSR, hastening the fall of Kiev and the Ukraine, 
leading to the capture of Moscow by the Germans and to the 
capture of Leningrad by the combined German and Finnish forces, 
and compelling the USSR to pass to the defensive for a long 
time, which would have enabled the Germans to release some 
fifty divisions in the east for a landing on the British Isles and 
for reinforcing the Geqnan-Italian front in the area of Egypt. 
Most likely the British Government would then have had to 
evacuate to Canada, while Egypt and the Suez Canal would have 
fallen under Hitler's sway. 
But that is not all. The USSR would have been compelled to 
transfer a large part of i.ts troops from the Manchurian border 
to the "Eastern" front to strengthen its defenses, and that would 
have enabled the Japanese to release some thirty divisions in Man-
churia and to send them against China, against the Philippine's, 
against southeastern Asia in general, and in the final analysis 
against the American armed forces in the Far East. 
As a result of all that, the war would have dragged on at least 
for two more years. The Second World War would then have 
ended, not in 1945, but in 1947 or somewhat later. 
That was how matters stood with regard to the question of an 
"Eastern" front. 
Meanwhile, events in the West took their course. In April, 
1940, the Germans occupied D.enmark and Norway. In the mid-
dle of May, German troops invaded Holland, Belgium and Lux-
. embourg. On May 21, the Germans reached the Channel and 
cut off the Allies in Flanders. Toward the . end of May, the 
British troops evacuated Dunkirk, withdrawing from France to 
England. In the middle of June, Paris fell. On June 22, France 
surrendered to Germany. 
Thus, Hitler trampled on all and sundry declarations of non-
aggression issued jointly with France and Britain. 
It meant the utter fiasco of the pol.icy of appeasement, of the 
policy of renouncing collective security, of the policy of isolating 
the USSR. 
It became clear that, by isolating the USSR, France and . 
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Britain had broken up the united front of the freedom-loving 
countries, had weakened themselves, and had placed themselves 
in isolation. . 
On March 1, 1941, the Germans occupied Bulgaria. 
On April 5, the USSR signed a pact of non-aggression with 
Yugoslavia. 
On June 22 of that year Germany attacked the USSR. 
Italy, Romania, Hungary, and Finland joined Germany in the 
war against the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet Union joined the war of liberation against Hitler 
Germany. 
Different circles in Europe and America took different atti-
tudes toward this event. 
The nations enslaved by Hitler breathed a sigh of relief, as they 
were certain that Hitler was bound to break his neck between 
the two fronts, the Western and the "Eastern". 
, The ruling circles o'f France were full of malicious glee as they 
did not doubt that "Russia would be smashed" in practically no 
time. . 
A prominent member of the Senate of the United States of 
America who is now President of the United States, Mr. Tru-
man, stated on the day after Germany's attack upon the USSR: 
"If we see that Germany is winni~g the war we ought to 
help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Ger-
many, and in that way let them kill as many as possible."36 
A similar statement was made in 1941 in Great Britain by 
the then Minister 'of Aircraft Production, Moore-Brabazon" who 
said that so far as Britain was concerned, the best outcome of the 
struggle on the Eastern front would be the mutual exhaustion of 
Germany and the USSR, as a result of which Britain would be 
enabled to attain a position of dominance. 
These statements undoubtedly expressed the position of reac-
tionary circles in the United States and Great Britain. 
However, the overwhelming majority of the British and Amer-
ican people favored the USSR, . demanding unity with .the Soviet 
Union for a successful struggle against Hitler Germany. 
S6 New York Times, June 24, 1941. 
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It is to be believed that the Prime Minister of Great Britain, 
Mr. Churchill, reflected these sentiments when he said on June 
22, 1941 that: 
"The Russian danger is therefore our danger and the danger 
of the United States, just as the cause of any Russian fighting 
for his hearth and home is the cause of free men and free peoples 
in every quarter of the globe." 
A similar position with regard to the USSR was taken by the 
Roosevelt Administration in the United States of America. 
A beginning was thus laid for an Anglo-Soviet-American 
coalition against Hitler Germany. 
The anti-Hitler coalition set itself the aim of smashing the 
Hitler regime and liberating the. nations enslaved by Hitler Ger-
many. Despite differences in the ideologies and economic systems 
of the Allied states, the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition became 
a mighty alliance of nations which merged their efforts in the 
liberation struggle against Hitlerism. 
Of course, there were differences among the Allies on certain 
questions during the war too. It is well known, for example, how 
significant were the differences on such maj o.r questions as the 
opening of a second ' front, the obligations of the Allies, their 
moral duty toward each other. 
Seizing upon these differences, the falsifiers of history and all 
sorts of calumniators are endeavoring to "prove", contrary to 
obvious facts, that the USSR was not, and could not be, a loyal 
and sincere ally in the struggle against Hitlerite aggression. But 
since the joint struggle against Hitler Germany and the -behavior 
of the USSR in that struggle provide no material for such an 
accusation, they turn to the past, to the prewar period, asserting 
that during the "negotiations" with Hitler in Berlin in 1940, the 
representatives of the Soviet Union behaved in a perfidious man-
ner, not as allies should behave. 
They assert that during the Berlin "negotiations" perfidious 
"plans for the partitioning of Europe", territorial claims of the 
Soviet Union "southward from the Soviet Union toward the In-
dian Ocean", "plans" concerning Turkey, Iran, Bulgaria and 
other "problems" were discussed and agreed upon. For this pur-
pose the slanderers make use of reports of German ambassadors 
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and other Hitlerite officials, all sorts of memoranda and German 
drafts of sQme sort of "protocols" and other similar "documents". 
What actually happened in Berlin? It must be $aid that the 
so-called "Berlin negotiations" in 1940 actually amounted to 
nothing more than V. M. Molotov's return visit to two visits 
paid by Ribbentrop to Moscow. The talks which took place con-
cerned, mainly, Soviet-German relations. Hitler tried to turn 
them into the basis for a broad agreement between the· German 
and Soviet parties. The Soviet side, on the contrary, used them 
to sound out, to probe the position of the German side without 
having any intention of concluding any agreement with the Ger-
mans. In the course of these talks, Hitler maintained that the 
Soviet Union ought to acquire an outlet to the Persian Gulf by 
occupying western Iran and the Eritish oil fields in Iran. He said, 
further, that Germany could help the Soviet Union to settle the 
matter in regard to its claims on Turkey, including the amend-
ment of the Montreux Treaty on the Straits; and while com-
pletely ignoring the interests of Iran, he carefully protected the 
interests of Turkey, obviously regarding the latter country as· his 
present, or at any rate, his future ally. As far as the Balkan 
countries and Turkey were concerned, Hitler rega~ded them as 
a sphere of influence of Germany and Italy. 
The Soviet Government drew the following conclusions from 
these talks: Germany did not value her connections with Iran; 
Germany was not connected and did not intend to establish con-
nections with Britain, which meant that the Soviet Union might 
find a reliable ally in Britain against Hitler Germany; the Bal-
kan States had either been already bought over and converted 
into Germany's satellites [Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary], had 
been enslaved like Czechoslovakia, or were on the way to being 
enslaved like Greece; Yugoslavia was the only Balkan country 
that could be relied upon as a future ally of the anti-Hitler 
camp; Turkey was already either bound by close ties to Hitler 
Germany or intended to form such ties. 
Having drawn these u~eful conclusions, the Soviet Govern-
ment never again resumed any talks on these questions despite 
Ribbentrop's repeated reminders. 
As can be seen, this was a case of sounding out, of probing the 
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posItIon of the Hitler Government by the Soviet Government, 
which did not arid could not end in any sort of agreement. 
Is it permissible for peace-loving states to practice such a sound-
ing out of an enemy's position? Unquestionably it is. It is not 
only permissible, but at times it is a direct political necessity. It is 
only necessary that such a sounding should take place with the 
knowledge and consent of allies, and that its results should be 
communicated to allies. At that time, however, the Soviet Union 
had no allies; it was isolated and unfortunately had nobody with 
whom to share the results of its sounding. 
It should be said that a similar-although ill-smelling-sound-
ing of the position of Hitler Germany was effected by represen-
tatives of Britain and the United States of America during the 
war, after the organization of the anti-Hitler coalition of Britain, 
the . United States c:tf America and the USSR. This is evident 
from documents captured by Soviet troops in Germany. 
From these documents it can be seen that in the autumn of 
1941 and also in 1942 and 1943, in Lisbon and in Switzerland, 
negotiations were carried on, behind the back of the USSR, be-
tween representatives of Britain and Germany, and later between 
representatives of the United States of America and Germany, 
on the subject of peace with Germany. 
One of the documents-a supplement to a report by Weiz-
saecker, the German Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs-re-
views the course of these negotiations in Lisbon in September 
1941. This document shows that on September 13, there was a 
meeting between Aitken; the son of Lord Beaverbrook, an officer 
of the British Army and later a Member of Parliament, repre-
senting Britain, and Gustav von Koever, a Hungarian, who acted 
with the authority of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
this can be seen from a letter addressed by Krauel, the German 
Consul General in Geneva, to W eizsaecker, the German Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
During the course of these negotiations Aitken posed the ques-
tion directly: "Could not the coming winter and spring be used 
to discuss, behind the scenes, the possibilities of peace?" 
Other documents tell of the negotiations which took place be-
tween representatives of the Governments of the United States 
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of America and Germany in Switzerland in February, 1943. In 
these negotiations, the United States of America was represented 
by a special delegate of the United States Government, Allen 
Dulles (the b~other of John Foster Dulles) who figured under 
the pseudonym of "Bull" and had "direct instructions and au-
thority from the White House". His German opposite number 
was Prince M. Hohenloe, a man closely connected with the ruling 
circles of Hitler Germany, who acted as Hitler's representative 
under the assumed name of Pauls. The document containing a 
summary of these negotiations belonged to the German Security 
Service (SD). 
As evident from this document, the conversation touched on 
important questions concerning Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Romania, Hungary and-this is particularly important-the 
question of the conclusion of peace with GerJ11any. 
During the conversation, Dulles (Bull), stated that: 
"In future, a situation will never again be permitted to arise 
where nations like Germany would be compelled to resort to 
desperate experiments and heroism as a result of injustice and 
want. The German State must continue to exist as a factor of 
order and rehabilitation. The partition of Germany or the 
separation of Austria is out of the question." 
Concerning Poland, Dulles (Bull) stated: 
". . . by extending Poland to the East and preserving Ro-
mania and a strong Hungary, the establishment of a cordon 
sanitaire -against Bolshevism and Pan-Slavism must be sup-
ported." 37 
The record of the conversation further says that: 
"Mr. Bull more or less agrees to the political and industrial 
organization of Europe on the basis of large territories, on the 
assumption that a federated Greater Germany (similar to the 
United States of America) with the adjoining Danubian Con-
federation will constitute the best guarantee of order and re-
habilitation in Central and Eastern Europe."38 




Dulles (Bull) also stated that he fully recognized the claim 
of German industry to the leading role in Europe. 
It must be noted that this sounding was effected by the British 
and Americans " without the knowledge or consent of their ally, 
the Soviet Union, . and that nothing was communicated to the 
Soviet Government concerning the results of it, even by way of 
subsequent information. 
This could mean that the Governments of the United States 
of America and Great Britain had in this instance made an at-
tempt to inaugurate negotiations with Hitler for a separate peace. 
Clearly, such behavior on the part of the Governments of 
Britain and the United States of America can only be regarded 
as an infringement of the "most elementary requirements in re-
spect of their allied duty and allied obligations. 
It therefore follows that the falsifiers of history, in accusing 
the USSR of "insincerity" are trying to shift the blame where it 
does not belong. 
Beyond any doubt, the falsifiers of history and other slanderers 
know of these documents. If they conceal them from the public, 
if they keep silent concerning them in their campaign of slander 
against the USSR, it is because they fear historical truth like the 
plague. 
As regards the differences of opinion concerning the opening 
of the Second Front, they reflected the different conceptions of the 
obligations of allies in respect to each other. Soviet people be-
lieve that if an ally is in trouble one should help him by all avail-
able means; that one should not treat an ally as a temporary fel-
low traveler, but as a friend; one should rejoice in his successes 
and in his growing strength. British and American representa-
tives do not agree with this and consider such morality naive. 
They are guided by the notion that a strong ally is dangerous; 
that the strengthening of an ally is not in their interests; that it 
is better to have a weak ally than a strong one; and that if an 
ally nevertheless grows stronger, then measures should be adopted 
to weaken him. 
Everybody knows that in the .. Anglo-Sovie and the Soviet-
American communiques of June, 1942, the British and Ameri-
cans assumed the obligation of opening the Second Front in 
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Europe as early as 1942. This was a solemn promise, a vow, if 
you will, which should have been fulfilled on time in order to 
make things easier for the Soviet forces, who, during the ,first 
period of the war, had borne the full brunt of resistance to Ger-
man fascism. It is also well known, howe~er, that this promise 
was not fulfilled either in 1942 or in 1943, despite the fact that 
the Soviet Government declared on several occasions that the 
Soviet Union could not reconcile itself to the postponement of 
the Second Front. 
There was nothing fortuitous about the policy of postponing 
the opening of ' the Second Front. It" was fostered by the aspira-
tions of those reactionary circles in Britain and the United States 
of America who pursued their own aims in the war against Ger-
many, aims that had nothing in common with the aims of a war 
of liberation against German fascism. Their plans did not call 
for the utter defeat of German fascism. They were interested in 
undermining Germany's power and, mainly, in eliminating Ger-
many as a dangerous competitor on the world market, in con-
formity with their narrow, selfish aims. They did not, however, 
at all intend to liberate Germany and other countries from the 
rule of reactionary forces which are the constant source of im-
perialist aggression and of fascism, or to carry out fundamental 
democratic reforms. 
At the same time they calculated that the USSR would be 
weakened, bled white, that as a result of the exhausting war it 
would for a long period of time lose its importance as a great 
and mighty power and would, after the war, become dependent 
upon the United States of America and Great Britain. 
The Soviet . Union, naturally, cannot consider such an attitude 
toward an ally as normal. 
Diametrically opposed to this policy is the policy pursued by 
the USSR in relations among the Allies. This policy is charac-
terized by invariably unselfish, consistent and honest observance 
of its undertakings and by readiness to render, at any time, com-
radely assistance to its ally. During the past war, the Soviet 
Union set exan1ples of such a truly allied attitude toward other 
countries, its comrades-in-arms in the struggle against the common 
enemy. 
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Here is one such fact. 
It will be remembered that at the end of December, 1944, the 
Hitler troops launched an offensive in the Ardennes area on the 
Western front, broke through the front and placed the Anglo-
American troops in a difficult position. According to the Allies, 
the Germans hoped, ' by attacking in the direction of Liege, to 
crush the First American Army, reach Antwerp, cut off the Ninth 
American, Second British, and First Canadian Armies, and ar-
range a second Dunkirk for the Allies in order to put Britain 
out of the war. 
In connection with this, on January 6, 1945, Winston Ch\lrchill 
addressed to J. V. Stalin the following message: 
"The fighting in the West is very heavy and at any time 
great decisions may be called for from the Supreme Command. 
You know yourself from your own experience how very anxious 
the position is when a very broad front has to be defended after 
temporary loss of the initiative. It is General Eisenhower's 
great desire and need to know in outline what you plan to do, 
as this obviously affects all his and our major decisions. Our 
envoy, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, was last night reported 
weatherbound in Cairo. His journey has been much delayed 
through no fault of yours. In case he has not reached you yet, 
I shall be grateful if you can tell me whether we can count on 
a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front, or elsewhere, 
during January, with any other points you may care to men-
tion. I shall not pass this most secret information to anyone 
except Field Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and 
only under conditions of the utmost secrecy. I regard the mat-
ter as urgent." . 
On January 7, 1945, J. V. Stalin sent W. Churchill the fol-
lowing answer: 
"I received your message of January 6, 1945, on the evening 
of January 7. 
"U nfortunately, Air Chief Marshal Tedder has not yet 
reached Moscow. 
"It is:very important to make use of our superiority over the 
Germans in artillery and air force. For this we need- clear 
weather for the air force and an absence of low mists, which 
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prevent the artillery from conducting aimed fire. We are pre-
paring an offensive, but at present the weather does not favor 
our offensive. However, in view of the position of our Allies 
on the Western front, Headquarters of the Supreme Com-
mand has decided to complete the preparations at a forced pace, 
and, disregarding the weather, to launch wide-scale offensive 
operations against . the Gennans all along the Central front 
not later than the second half of January. You need not doubt 
that we shall do everything that can possibly be done to render 
help to the glorious troops of our Allies." 
In his reply to this message, W. Churchill wrote to J. V. 
Stalin on January 9: 
"I am most grateful to you for your thrilling message. I 
have sent it to General Eisenhower for his eye only. Mayall 
good fortune rest upon your noble venture." 
In their desire to expedite aid to the Allied forces in the West, 
the Supreme High Command of the Soviet forces decided to move 
the date of the offensive against the Germans on the Soviet-Ger-
man front from January 20 to January 12. On January 12 a 
great offensive was launched by the Soviet forces on a wide front 
from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians. One hundred and fifty 
Soviet divisions were set in motion, supported by a large quantity 
of artillery and aircraft; they broke through the German front 
and threw the German troops back for hundreds of kilometers. 
On January 12, German troops on the Western front, among 
them the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies, which had been placed 
in position for another drive, ceased their offensive and during 
the course of five or six days w~re withdrawn .from the front and 
transferred to the East against the attacking Soviet troops. The 
German offensive in· the West was frustrated. 
On January 17, W. Churchill wrote to J. V. Stalin: 
"I am most grateful to you for your message and am ex-
tremely glad that Air Marshal Tedder made so favorable an 
impression upon you. On behalf of His Majesty's Government 
and from the bottom of my heart, I offer you our thanks and 
congratulations on the immense assault you have launched upon 
the Eastern front. 
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"You will now, no doubt, know the plans of General Eisen-
hower and to what extent they have been delayed by Rund-
stedt's spoiling attack. I am sure that fighting along our whole 
front will be continuous. The British Twenty-first Army 
Group, under Field Marshal Montgomery, has today begun 
an attack in the area south of Roermond." 
An Order of the Day issued by J. V. Stalin to Soviet troops 
in February 1945, said, concerning this offensive of Soviet troops: 
"In January of this year, the Red Army brought down upon 
. the enemy a blow of unparalleled force along the entire front 
from the Baltic to the Carpathians. On a stretch of 1,200 
kilometers it broke up the powerful defenses of the Germans, 
which they had been building for a number of years. In the 
course of the offensive, the Red Army, by its swift and skillful 
actions, has hurled the enemy far back to the West. The first 
consequence of the successes of our winter offensive was that 
they thwarted the Germans' winter offensive in the West, 
which aimed at the seizure of Belgium and Alsace, and they 
enabled the Armies of our Allies in their turn to launch an 
offensive against the Germans and thus to link up their offen-
sive operations in the West with the offensive operations of 
the Red Army in the East." 
That is how J. V. Stalin acted. 
That is how true allies act in a common struggle. 
These are the facts. 
Naturally, the falsifiers of history and the slanderers are called 
falsifiers and slanderers because · they do not entertain any respect 
for facts. They prefer to gossip and slander. There is, however, 
no reason to doubt that these gentlemen will, in the end, have to 
acknowledge the universally known truth, which is, that gossip 
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